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INTRODUCTION
Many leaders of the bar assert that we need additional lawyers to
meet the needs of our people, and that our present institutional arrange-
ments are inadequate to provide the services that people need at a price
that they can afford.' These same leaders argue convincingly that the
real threat to the bar does not lie in creative new programs that provide
legal assistance to those whose needs are not now being adequately met.
Paradoxically, their arguments reveal that the real danger may be an
adverse reaction on the part of the public to a profession that has been
permitted to exercise monopoly power for private gain but then fails to
develop techniques to make its services available to all.2
Many other lawyers approach legal aid with a trilogy of assumptions
that are accepted as fundamental truths upon which all subsequent dis-
cussions must proceed:
(1) We already have enough, if not too many lawyers;
(2) There is no real need for a formalized program of legal assis-
tance to the poor, because a poor man with a meritorious cause
can always find some lawyer to take his case;
(3) Any proposal that involves a change from the traditional system
of an individual client selecting and paying a general practitioner
will inevitably endanger the independence of the bar and consti-
tute a threat to its economic well-being.
This dispute within the bar cannot be resolved by rhetoric. North
Carolina provides an example of the need for lawyers. In 1966, there
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were 4,279 lawyers to serve a population of approximately 5,000,000,3 a
ratio of 1,168 persons to each lawyer.' Only South Carolina had fewer
lawyers per capita.' This is almost double the national ratio of 621 to 1.
This numerical imbalance suggests that practitioners command a
sufficient clientele to generate remunerative incomes. Available evidence
indicates, however, that lawyers in the state make considerably less,
not more, than their colleagues elsewhere. Despite the comparatively
large number of potential clients for each lawyer, the most recent study
of the American Bar Association found that North Carolina sole practi-
tioners rank 31 out of 34 in state rankings of average net income, and
the average net income of North Carolina partners ranks them 25 out of
26.7 Indeed, the net income of North Carolina lawyers approaches only
about 68 to 70 percent of the national average.8
One reason for the low level of lawyers' incomes is the comparatively
low income of many North Carolina citizens. A recent study by the
North Carolina Fund reported that the state ranks forty-third in per
capita income, and is tied for last in average hourly earnings of produc-
tion workers in manufacturing industries.9 In 1966, 28.1 percent of North
Carolina households reported incomes of under 3,000 dollars.' 0
The problem is compounded by the high percentage of people located
in rural areas and small communities. Traditionally, decentralization of
population has tended to produce a higher percentage of single practi-
tioners and small firms where specialization is the exception rather than
the rule. In general, the income of single practitioners is far less than
the income of partners." The lawyers in North Carolina, however,
are much more centralized than the population as a whole. Almost one-
half of the bar is located in cities of 50,0001" or more, and these cities
account for only about 20 percent of the state's population. 13
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The North Carolina bar is small and not relatively well paid. The
population is decentralized and comparatively poor. These facts suggest
that a substantial number of people in North Carolina have legal problems
but cannot afford to pay a reasonable fee for an attorney. They also suggest
that attorneys who can afford to handle cases for less than a reasonable fee
are limited and, of those available, few are conveniently located.
Information is not available on how many poor people have legal
problems or how many actually obtain the assistance of lawyers. One
recent study concludes that two-thirds of lower-class American families
have never employed an attorney.14 Some studies estimate a national
average of seven to ten persons per thousand as a measure of those need-
ing legal aid services. 5 The demand, however, may be elastic. Communi-
ties that have initiated legal aid programs find that the number of people
seeking services expands in proportion to the availability of conveniently
located, competent attorneys.' 6
Experience demonstrates that it is not necessary that the lawyer be
paid by his client for the bar to retain its independence. The independence
of the bar has never been threatened by insurance companies, which hire
and pay lawyers in most of our defense personal injury practice. Likewise,
assigned counsel systems supported by states or the federal government
have demonstrated that an attorney may be paid by the piper while playing
his own tune. The operation of legal assistance offices and organized de-
fense efforts in the JAG offices of the armed services, the experience of
fifty years in the public defenders' offices in California, and the experience
in the many legal aid offices across the country show that lawyers by dis-
position and training refuse to pull their punches regardless of the source
of their income. Indeed, in many communities the only complaints regard-
ing counsel for the indigent relate to over-aggressiveness rather than to
any unethical compromises of the rights of clients.
The advent of legal aid has not caused economic hardship to the legal
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profession. It has relieved lawyers of the responsibility of undertaking
unremunerative cases in order to see justice done and has produced a sub-
stantial number of referrals of clients who do not meet indigency stan-
dards. It has also produced a substantial volume of litigation in which a
private practitioner is employed by a paying client to defend or prosecute
a case because an indigent has counsel capable of representing him suffi-
ciently well that a landlord, creditor or a public agency itself perceived
the need for a lawyer.
Furthermore, legal services programs provide jobs for lawyers and
training of the kind formerly available only in the offices of district
attorneys, solicitors, or city attorneys. The trial bar of the next genera-
tion will owe a great deal to today's legal services programs, which are
providing trial experience to young lawyers in numbers not previously
possible.
Some individual lawyers may suffer temporary losses, however. Cli-
ents of marginal practitioners may qualify for free representation if the
indigency standard is set at a reasonable level; other clients may com-
pare the quality of the services of some private lawyers unfavorably with
the kind of representation provided by a legal aid lawyer, who, secure in
a salary, may be able to spend more time in preparation, and who also
may benefit from the assistance of an investigator and a library that the
private practitioner cannot afford. Some legal aid lawyers may develop
reputations for excellence and constitute a substantial competitive force
when they leave legal aid and enter private practice. Nonindigent clients
who might have gone to Lawyer A by accident may end up in the offices of
Lawyer B after referral from a legal aid office.' 7 Collection lawyers who
make their living from a volume practice before small claims and landlord
and tenant courts at a small fee per unit lose money when the routine of
default judgments in those courts is interrupted by the assertion of a
defense on the merits.' 8
Some of these objections are not worthy of a response, but others
pose real problems to public-spirited lawyers. What is necessary is the
exercise of responsibility and authority by the bar in the development and
operation of these programs. The bar is capable of supervising a legal
services program in such a way as to minimize the unnecessary and unfair
loss of business to anyone, while obtaining the advantages to lawyers, in-
"' Pye & Garraty, The Involvement of the Bar in the War Against Poverty, 41
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digents, and the public that will result from providing representation to
those who cannot afford it. Bars with experience have found that the
advantages of legal aid programs more than outweigh their disadvantages.
THE LAST FIvE YEARS
As late as April, 1965, there were only 157 legal aid offices with paid
staffs providing legal services to indigents in civil matters. Assistance
was provided to indigents in 414,000 cases, at a cost of four and a
third million dollars.'" Legal services in over 206,000 criminal cases
were provided by 162 defender organizations at a cost of approximately
five million dollars, in addition to state compensated counsel in some
states." Exclusive of volunteer services, organized legal aid was pro-
viding representation in over 600,000 civil and criminal cases at a cost of
nine and a third million dollars.2 ' Most of the offices had caseloads of
over 1,000 cases per attorney per year.22 By April of 1968, there were
511 offices with paid staffs, which handled over 791,000 civil cases and
21-0 defender organizations which provided representation in over 465,000
criminal cases.3 In 1967 legal aid organizations provided representation
to 'over- 1256,000 persons at a cost of 47,000,000 dollars. 4 Of that
amount, only $178,000 was spent in North Carolina, three quarters of
it: in Winston-Salem.25 At the end of 1968 there were 643 civil legal aid
and 315 defender agencies in the country. Included in this number
were four in North Carolina, all west of Raleigh.
- The dramatic upswing in organized legal aid activity is only part
of the story. In 1964, the federal government made funds available to
compensate assigned counsel in criminal cases. A number of states
enacted statutes to authorize compensation to appointed counsel at various
"tages of the criminal process.2 In other communities lawyers are now
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being appointed to cases without being compensated. Volunteer services
in civil cases also have been made available on an organized basis in many
localities as part of the local contribution required for federal financial
support. Additional volunteer lawyers are being provided by Vista,2" and
the bar for decades has generously provided free services to the poor. The
advent of organized legal aid, although steadily increasing, has not yet
supplanted the need for this public service.
Many factors have contributed to this remarkable growth of legal
assistance to the poor. In criminal cases the most important development
undoubtedly was Gideon v. Wainwright and its progeny30 States that
previously demonstrated little solicitude for an indigent charged with
crime in routine cases promptly began to provide lawyers -when: the
absence of counsel -was held to be a constitutional defect that rendered a
state criminal judgment vulnerable to attack in the federal courts.
The most significant factor in civil cases was the Economic Oppor-
tunity Act of 196431 and the administrative decision, subsequently em-
bodied in a 1965 amendment of the Act,82 that funds authorized for com-
munity action programs could be utilized to provide legal services.3 3 , The
magnitude of this development is evident from the fact that by the end
of 1968, it had assisted 265 communities to provide expanded or new legal
services at a cost of 42,000,000 dollars.34 In January of 1969, the Stand-
ing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants of the American Bar
Association credited the Legal Services Program of OEO with achieving
a six-fold increase in the availability of legal services to the poor.8 .-
A third factor of crucial importance has been the attitude of the bar.
In February, 1965, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Associ -
tion unanimously approved a resolution directing the offices and com-
mittees of the Association to cooperate with OEO in the development and
implementation of programs for expanding availability of legal services
to indigents."8 The leaders of the ABA participated in the formulation
o "Vista" is Volunteeers in Service to America, a domestic volunteer service
program established by Title VIII of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964,'42
U.S.C. §§ 2701-2981 (1964). -
"0 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). - -
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82Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-253, § 12, 79
Stat. 973.
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of the basic policies and have been in regular communication with OEO
With respect to the administration of the program.37 Led by the ABA,
many state and local bar associations have worked with OEO in getting
new programs off the ground.
New vistas have been opened recently as a result of the decision of
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in late 1968 to provide
legal services to the poor financed through federally assisted public welfare
programs. The HEW program has been tersely summarized by the ABA
Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants:
In essence the HEW program provides for mandatory representation
of welfare clients by lawyers at administrative fair hearing proceedings
and for optional legal services of a broad nature for 8 million welfare
recipients and other needy persons. Each state determines the nature
and extent of its own "optional" program but the "full spectrum of
service" is encouraged. This may include all matters excepting only
fee-generating cases, juvenile representation and certain criminal cases
where the state has an obligation to furnish counsel. The state must
ordinarily contribute 25% of the cost with the remaining 75% being met
by the federal government. Although the program is administered by
state welfare departments, it is to be conducted professionally by lawyers
in accordance with the standards and ethics of the legal profession.
The program is to be developed and operated in close consultation with
the organized bar and other interested groups. It is to be closely
coordinated with and to use the existing facilities of OEO funded and
other legal services and legal aid agencies wherever possible.88
The American Bar Association has indicated its willingness to partici-
pate in the development of this program and has urged HEW to continue
the closest cooperation with state and local bar associations in the develop-
ment and operation of the program."
Partly because of the failure of some OEO officials to understand
local bar attitudes, bar approbation has not been universal. Fortunately,
the fear of a "rigid hostility of change' 40 has not been justified in North
Carolina. In 1969, there were OEO-supported programs in Charlotte
and Winston-Salem and a privately-funded office in Greensboro. 41 In addi-
oN LAw AND POVERTY 68 (1965); see McCalpin, The Bar Faces Forward, 51
A.B.A.J. 548 (1965).
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tion, an OEO grant to the Duke University School of Law established a
neighborhood office in Durham and authorized the utilization of students
from the law schools in the state to provide logistical assistance to opera-
tional legal aid programs in North and South Carolina.
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS'
There is little evidence that permits firm conclusions concerning the
effectiveness of legal services programs. Any evaluation depends upon
subjective judgments concerning goals and the best means of achieving
them. In most legal services programs there is an attempt to undertake
all types of legal services to as many of the poor as can be represented
at all stages of civil proceedings, with at least lip service to the notion
of simultaneously undertaking law reform and community education."'
It is one thing for an individual program to determine that its principal
mission is to obtain basic institutional reform in the expectation that this
will permit or help the poor to break out of the cycle of poverty. It is
another for a program to set as its goal the representation of the largest
number of indigents possible in the legal matters that concern them most.
A program with either goal can be evaluated in terms of how close it
comes to its principal objective with the resources it has available.
When a program has both objectives and accords neither a clear priority,
its performance is much more difficult to assess.
Judgments concerning effectiveness are also made difficult because
of the newness of most programs. It takes time to assemble a staff, work
out local arrangements with the bar, become known in the community,
establish routine office practices, develop specialties among staff members,
and replace initial appointments that simply do not work out.
All legal aid programs supported by OEO funds are evaluated at least
once a year by teams normally composed of an OEO staff member and
consultants drawn from private practice, the law schools, or other legal
services programs. In addition, the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association sends representatives to visit the offices of its members. OEO
has attempted to develop uniform criteria for evaluation in guidelines
provided its evaluators.4" However, the quality of the reports vary con-
siderably, and it is not yet possible to form a general impression of the
effectiveness of legal services programs across the country by a composite
of the evaluation reports.
4 2See Pye, supra. note 16, at 244.
See Barvick, Lepral Services Program Evaluations, 26 LEGAL AID BRIEr
CASE 195 (1968).
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This much, however, is clear. The quality of personnel in legal ser-
vices offices has improved. A substantial number of the best young law
school graduates are accepting positions in legal services programs. In
particular, the Reginald Heber Smith Fellowship program, providing
graduate education in law and poverty with the assignment of fellows
to individual legal services offices, has stimulated the imagination of law
students across the nation. It is particularly gratifying that a number of
the best students, who could be employed elsewhere at much higher salaries,
have chosen (temporarily at least) to forsake greater financial gain for
legal aid work.
At the same time, some programs still employ attorneys whose level
of competence renders them unemployable by many law firms. There have
also been some occasions when a premium seems to have been placed on
selecting attorneys of a particular race or ethnic group rather than hiring
on the sole criterion of the best available lawyers.
Boosted to a considerable extent by substantial raises in salaries,
the morale in legal service programs is high. It is too soon to estimate
what the long-range effects of a changed personnel situation will be.
Salaries above the starting level are extremely low compared with private
practice, or government, or legal education. This poses a real threat that
many of the best people will have to leave legal aid work as their
families grow and their financial obligations mount. A distinct possi-
bility exists that only the least qualified will remain and that the directors
and supervising attorneys twenty years from now will be the people who
could not leave because other jobs were not readily available to them.
Efforts at continuing legal education for attorneys in legal aid work
have been extremely successful. The National Institute for Education
in Law and Poverty at Northwestern University has presented several
regional institutes on subjects such as the welfare system and consumer
problems. The National Clearinghouse for Legal Services distributes
summaries of relevant cases, briefs, memoranda and pleadings. OEO
publishes a newsletter, Law in Action, and there is now a Commerce
Clearing House poverty law service. Attorneys throughout the country
are able to keep abreast of the latest developments in areas of particular
concern to the poor.
Undoubtedly, there are economies that can be effected in some offices.
Some OEO legal services offices have equipment not regularly found any-
where except in the largest law firms or government offices. Xerox equip-
ment, cameras, and the most expensive dictating equipment have been
[V/ol. 47
authorized in some grants upon the assumption that attorneys for the poor
should have equipment as good as that available to attorneys for the
rich. The result has been that some legal aid offices have equipment that
a substantial percentage of lawyers in private practice cannot afford.
Though the best available equipment is helpful, some corners can be
cut without materially impairing efficiency. The same criteria should be
used in equipping legal services offices that would be used by the average
attorney in practice.
In many large legal aid offices there are substantial staffs of sub-
professional personnel other than secretaries. Many of these people are
valuable additions to the offices, serving as office managers, investigators,
or librarians; but some of them are not qualified to do the job for which
they were hired. There have been occasions when men without experi-
ence have been hired as investigators and used as messengers. Euphemisms
such as "in-service training" have substituted for training programs or
prior experience as justification for the employment of members of
minority groups to serve as contacts with a local community.44 In some
cases the individuals serving in these positions resemble the political
patronage appointees of bygone days more than the kind of sub-profes-
sional personnel who should be found in a lawyer's office. There are,
however, problems of community contact when a office opens, particu-
larly if the staff lawyers are white and its clientele is composed largely of
Negroes or Mexican-Americans. The ability of the office to provide jobs
to members of the community is an important way to gain acceptance
of the attorneys who are beginning their practice. In the long run, how-
ever, efficiency will require that only competent people be hired or that
substantial training programs be introduced. There is not enough money
available for legal aid to permit funds to be used to alleviate the problem
of unemployment among unskilled people in the ghetto.
One contribution of legal services not contemplated at the time the
federal program was initiated is the role that these programs play in
watering down the tinderbox in our ghettos. In a sense, the legal services
office operates as a safety valve--a device for letting off steam. It is a
place where someone can come for the redress of grievances with some
hope of success without the necessity of resorting to violence. As an out-
let for the frustrations of ghetto dwellers it may be a more useful device
" There are some training programs, however. Dixwell Legal Rights Associa-
tion, Inc., of New Haven, Connectictit, a research and demonstration project
funded by* 'OO, is an example.
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of social control than riot equipment for a police department. The legal
services program received a considerable boost from the conclusions of
the National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders, which urged the
expansion of programs providing legal assistance to the poor. The role
that can be played by legal services in curbing potential urban disorders
was graphically illustrated in the report of the Commission:
Among the most intense grievances underlying the riots of the summer
of 1967 were those which derived from conflicts between ghetto resi-
dents and private parties, principally white landlords and merchants.
Though the legal obstacles are considerable, resourcefulness and imag-
inative use of available legal processes could contribute significantly
to the alleviation of tensions resulting from these and other conflicts.
Moreover, through the adversary process which is at the heart of our
judicial system, litigants are afforded meaningful opportunity to in-
fluence events which affect them and their community. However,
effective utilization of the courts requires legal assistance, a resource
seldom available to the poor.
Litigation is not the only need which ghetto residents have for legal
service. Participation in the grievance procedures suggested above
may well require legal assistance. More importantly, ghetto residents
have need of effective advocacy of their interests and concerns in a
variety of other contexts, from representation before welfare agencies
and other institutions of government to advocacy before planning boards
and commissions concerned with the formulation of development plans.
Again, professional representation can provide substantial benefits in
terms of overcoming the ghetto resident's alienation from the institu-
tions of government by implicating him in its processes. Although law-
yers function in precisely this fashion for the middle-class clients, they
are too often not available to the impoverished ghetto resident.45
The role of a private lawyer is not restricted to the representation
of clients in adversary proceedings. He is a planner, providing advice
to his clients concerning the best ways to plan for their private or business
lives. These same talents are being used by legal aid lawyers for the
poor. During the last year there has been a substantial increase in the role
of legal services programs in self-help economic efforts among the poor.
Local legal aid lawyers are attempting to create new housing, new com-
mercial and credit organizations, new service and production enterprises,
and new coiperatives. These new functions may prove to be of greater
significance than any other phase of legal aid work.46
" REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 292-93
(paperback ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as RIOT COMMISSION REPORT].
"' See LAW IN AcTION, Oct.-Nov. 1968, at 5; LAW IN ACTION, Dec. 1968, at 12.
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INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
It is probably unfair at this time to attempt to estimate the impact of
legal services programs in effecting institutional reform. The great
majority of offices have spent more of their time servicing routine cases,
and such efforts as have been directed to the promotion of institutional
reform have been too diffuse. Presupposing, however, that such reform
activity provides some qualitative measure of the "work product" for
these past few years, a review of recent cases would be instructive. In
doing so it is prudent to question whether the goal of basic institutional
reform can properly be attained through the judicial process. We shall
consider these issues in the context of those areas of the law which were
not subject to serious judicial scrutiny prior to 1965, but which are cur-
rently considered appropriate for judicial reform.
Court Costs and Fees
There can be no justice for the poor if they are unable to secure redress
in the courts. There are in existence a myriad of charges, such as filing
and marshal's fees, fees for jury demands, supersedas bonds, and publi-
cation costs, which are considered a traditional part of our judicial
system, and which effectively block access of the poor to the courts. As
Elihu Root observed:
The administration of American justice is not impartial, the rich
and the poor do not stand on an equality before the law, the traditional
method of providing justice has operated to close the doors of the
courts to the poor, and has caused a gross denial of justice in all parts
of the country to millions of persons.47
In 1924, the American Bar Association drafted a Model Poor Litigant's
Statute providing for waiver of security for costs and fees and the appoint-
ment of a "conducting attorney" to be paid from public moneys.48 Later,
"Root, Ought We Bestir Ourselves?, 17 LEAAL AID REv. 1, 4 (1919). One
year later, Charles Evans Hughes took notice of court procedure and added:
The poor man must have legal advice and except in the simplest matters
he needs skilled advice to present the merits of his case. Simplicity in court
procedure and the multiplication of tribunals with specific functions are not
enough. Speed and cheapness do not suffice. . . . You may provide the
machinery of courts, but to have justice according to law, save in a very
limited class of cases where a judge may act as an advisor, you must have
the aid of lawyers.
Hughes, Justice and the Poor-Legal Aid Societies, Their Function and Necessity,
18 LEGAL AID REv. 1, 4 (1920).
"849 A.B.A. REP. 386 (1924). A second draft of the model statute appears in
50 A.B.A. REP. 456 (1925).
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in 1941, legislation was recommended which would provide a fund for
auxiliary charges of litigation such as witness fees and advertising costs. 49
A 1966 report of the ABA concluded:
Although fees charged to litigants do not produce nearly enough
revenues to operate the federal and state courts, such fees and auxiliary
charges are so high as to constitute a substantial deterrent to the poor
litigant if he must pay for these expenses himself.60
It would be expected that the courts themselves would perceive the gross
injustices of a system that closes its doors to all save the financially
eligible. The reverse has proven true.
Costs and charges have frequently been viewed in the same context as
requirements pertaining to time of filing of briefs, notices of appeal, and
other procedural niceties, which-if not complied with-may reach juris-
dictional proportions. Thus, in 1868, the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
although noting that it seemed "almost like a hardship that a poor man
should not be able to litigate,"'" dismissed an appeal for inability to post
a bond. Similarly, when pressed with the argument that denial of judicial
review for want of means to pay a seven dollar filing fee was a violation
of the equal protection clause, a three-judge district court in Connecticut
concluded in 1968 that, although it was a great injustice, the court should
not, by resort to the Constitution, overturn over one hundred years of
accepted practice.5 2 The court's awareness of a wrong possibly susceptible
to constitutional sanctions, however, far exceeds that of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, which blandly dismissed an action because
of the defendant's inability to post a required bond:
The present case is a civil action between private parties. In such
litigation the rights of both parties must be respected. We are aware of
no constitutional principle which authorizes a denial or diminishing of
rights of one litigant because of the financial condition of another. 3
" AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID WORK, ANNUAL REPORT
& TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS OF 5TH1 OPEN MEETING ON LEGAL AID WORK
(1941).
" L. SILVERSTEIN, PUBLIC PROVISION FOR COSTS AND EXPENSES OF CIVIL. LITI-
GATION 2-3 (1966).
" Campbell v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 23 Wis. 490, 491 (1868).
"Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968 (D. Conn. 1968). Subsequently, a
class action also attacking the seven dollar fee as unconstitutional was brought in
the same court. Frederick v. Schwartz, CCH POVERTY L. REP. 9159 (D. Conn.
Oct. 15, 1968).
" Thompson v. Mazo, 245 A.2d 122, 124 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
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There have been continued efforts for judicial relief. In Williams
v. Shaffer,54 the petitioners were given notice of summary eviction pro-
ceedings against them. A Georgia statute provided for a full hearing upon
the posting of cash collateral equal to double the rent to become due in six
months. Although agreeing to pay into the court all rents to become due
(and thus protect the landlord), they were unable to secure a sufficient
sum of money to satisfy the collateral requirement. Their defenses were
dismissed and the eviction effected. The Supreme Court of Georgia
affirmed, and certiorari was denied. Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by the
Chief Justice and with the concurrence of Justice Brennan, dissented, con-
cluding, inter alia:
The effect of the security statute is to grant an affluent tenant a hearing
and to deny an indigent tenant a hearing. The ability to obtain a hear-
ing is thus made to turn on the tenant's wealth.... We have recog-
nized that the promise of equal justice for all would be an empty phrase
for the poor if the ability to obtain judicial relief were made to turn on
the length of a person's purse .... I can see no ... justification for
denying an indigent a hearing in an eviction proceeding solely because
of his poverty ....
... This Court of course does not sit to 'cure social ills that beset the
country. But when we are faced with a statute that apparently violates
the Equal Protection Clause by patently discriminating against the poor
and thereby worsening their already sorry plight, we should address
ourselves to it.5r
Following this decision, the Director of Legal Services for OEO called
for a program that would "press outward the boundaries" of equal pro-
tection and due process on behalf of the poor.56 Subsequent decisions
indicate that the leverage supplied by the dissent in Williams has been
effectively applied.
In the latter part of 1968, an action was brought in Fulton County,
Georgia, to have tenants evicted under the statute questioned in Williams.
Again the tenants were unable to post the required bond. In ordering
the case to proceed without payment, the trial court went to the heart of
the constitutional issue:
" 385 U.S. 1037 (1967). It was argued that the same equal protection concepts
employed in cases striking down fees and costs in criminal appeals apply to civil
cases. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). In Griffin, the petitioner was
denied a free transcript essential to appellate review. In striking down the denial,
the Court held that distinctions based on wealth-at least those which discriminate
against basic rights of the poor-are invalid in criminal cases.
385 U.S. at 1039-40, 1041.
Griffin, Director's Column, LAw i1N AcTIoN, Oct.-Nov. 1968, at 3.
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The real question at issue is whether the defendants are to be granted
a hearing before their dispossession .... The requirement that an
indigent post a bond beore he is granted a hearing is an impossibility.
The uncontradicted evidence in these proceedings show that the de-
fendants are indigent and unable to obtain bonds; this situation takes
on increasing importance when considered in light of the evidence that
during the year 1967 more than 19,000 dispossessory warrants were
issued in Fulton County and the fact that defenses were actually inter-
posed in merely 13 instances.
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not sub-
ject to a construction which allows a man of means to defend his rights
in court while denying the same opportunity to the indigent. The
availability of the courts is necessarily open to all-both rich and poor
alike. Equal protection of the laws does not permit as a condition
precedent for access to the machinery of the courts a bond which the
defendant is without means to procure.57
One month later, Helen Jeffreys sued her husband for divorce in the
Kings County branch of the New York Supreme Court. She was un-
employed, living on public assistance, and unable to pay the fees and
expenses necessary to prosecute the action. Inasmuch as her husband could
not be located, publication expenses amounting to some three hundred
dollars were to be incurred. The "beginnings and glimmerings"58 in
Williams were sufficient justification for the court to conclude that the
equal protection clause required dispensing with the payment of these costs.
The opinion concludes: "[T] he establishment of civil courts for enforcing
claims and vindicating legal rights is so fundamental, the state cannot
close the system to any person because of poverty.""9 A similar result was
reached by an Oregon circuit court, which held filing fees for divorces as
applied to indigents unconstitutional, on the grounds that access to the
courts was a protected first amendment right of "redress of grievances,"
as well as a requirement of the due process of law made applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment.6 0
" Sanks v. Sanks, CCH POVERTY L. REP. 9270, at 10,514 (Ga. Civ. Ct., Fulton
County, Oct. 2, 1968) (emphasis added). Subsequent to the time this article went
to press, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed, finding the bond requirement reason-
able and not subject to Constitutional attack. State v. Sanks, CCH POVERTY L.
REP. 9373, at 10,596 (Ga. Sup. Ct. Jan. 23, 1969).
8 Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, - Misc. 2d -, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
'Id. at -, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 87.





As conceived by the Housing Act of 1937, access to public housing is
restricted to "families of low income ... who are in the lowest income
group and who cannot afford to pay enough to cause private enterprise
in their locality... to build an adequate supply of decent, safe, and sani-
tary dwellings for their use." 1 Every state now has either federal or
state-supported units in plan or operation."2 In fact, at the close of 1965
more than one out of every hundred people lived in publicly assisted
housing with over half of the occupancy below the age of eighteen.0 The
demand is exemplified by the New York Housing Authority, which re-
ceives 90,000 applications out of which it selects, on the average, 10,000
for admission.6 The question of who should be admitted and on what
conditions becomes critical when, by definition, such projects are designed
to fulfill the housing needs of a population segment unable to find decent
housing elsewhere."
The federal housing law sets forth no specific eligibility standards save
for requesting local agencies to adopt admission policies that, in addition
to recognizing their responsibility for housing displaced families and
veterans, give full consideration to the applicant's age, disability, and
need.66 No restrictions are imposed on the administration of projects
or the termination of tenancies.6 7 In substance and in form the power
8142 U.S.C. § 1402(2) (1964).
"Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 54 CALIF. L. REv.
642, 642-43 (1966).
" Rosen, Tenants' Rights in Public Housing, in HOUSING FOR THE POOR:
RIGHTS AND :REmEnIEs 154 (1967).
"Id. at 172 n.41.
"'Whether public housing, in light of the deterioration of its buildings, the
continuing instability of its residents, and the crime and human misery that are
now part and parcel of its projects, adequately meets the needs of its residents is
a question beyond the scope of this article. The problems have been documented
by others. See FISHER, TWENTY YEARS OF PUBLIC HOUSING (1959); H. SALISBURY,
THE SHoox-UP GENERATION 74-77 (1958); Friedman, supra note 62; Mulvihill,
Proble s in the Management of Public Housing, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 163 (1962);
Rosen, supra note 63; Note, Government Housing Assistance to the Poor, 76 YALE
L.J. 508 (1967).
8842 U.S.C. § 1410(g) (2) (1964).
The housing acts passed by Congress contain one ground (excluding the
Gwinn Amendment, infra note 82) for eviction-over-income. Every local housing
authority is empowered "to maintain an action or proceeding to recover possession
of any housing accommodations operated by it where such action is authorized by
the statutes or regulations under which such housing accommodations are admin-
istered .... ." 42 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964). Each local authority is also required
to make a "periodic reexamination" of its tenants' income and "require any family
whose income has increased beyond the approved maximum income limits for
199
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to decide ultimately all tenant qualifications resides with each local author-
ity.
There is reason to believe that some tenants seeking improvements
in a project have been threatened with termination for "partisan" or
"controversial" activity. 8 Families engaging in political activities,"0 and
those with illegitimate children7" or an imprisoned family membere1 have
been subjected to ejectment. In fact, the administration of local housing
authorities has been so fraught with abuse that Mr. Justice Fortas was
forced to comment:
Residents of public housing accommodations are subjected to inquiries
and surveillance concerning their morals and private life, on the theory
continued occupancy to move from the project unless the public housing agency
determines that, due to special circumstances, the family is unable to find decent,
safe and sanitary housing within its financial reach .. . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g) (3)
(1964).
8 Miller & Werthman, Public Housing: Tenants and Troubles, 8 DISSENT 282,
286-87 (1961).
" In Housing Auth. v. Venezie, 25 BEAVER Co. L.J. 92 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1963), an
eviction was upheld when the tenant refused to stop associating with certain named
individuals; cf. Thorpe v. Durham Housing Auth., 89 S. Ct. 518 (1969). Contra,
Holt v. Richmond Redev. & Housing Auth., 266 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Va. 1966),
noted in WELFAm L. BULL., Feb. 1967, at 5 (eviction for political activities held
violative of first amendment rights). See generally Rosen, supra note 63, at 193-97.
Indicative of attitudes demonstrated by various project managers is the following
comment: "We don't want none of them organizers in here . . . all they do is
stir up trouble. Used to be some organizers around here. But we cleaned them out
good. Lotsa Communists. That's what they were." H. SALISBURY, supra note
65, at 67.
" In Richardson v. Housing Auth., Civ. No. 678 (E.D.N.C. 1966), noted in
WELFARE L. BULL., Nov. 1966, at 6-7, a class action was brought seeking to have
declared unconstitutional a covenant that read:
If additional illegitimate children are born to me or any members of my im-
mediate family during my tenancy in properties of the landlord . . . I will
within thirty (30) days after birth of such child, vacate and remove myself
and family from any property or housing accommodations either owned,
operated, or managed by landlord ....
Id. at 6.
In Williams v. Housing Auth., 223 Ga. 407, 155 S.E.2d 923 (1967), the court
upheld the eviction of a tenant who failed to reveal the birth of an illegitimate child.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, recently remanded a case for de-
termination of the constitutionality of the eviction for illegitimate children. Lewis
v. Housing Auth., 397 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1968). See also Williams v. City of
Ypsilanti, Civ. No. 28936 (E.D. Mich. 1966), noted in WELFA E L. BULL., Feb.
1967, at 5. -
"' Sanders v. Cruise, 10 Misc. 2d 533, 173 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1958). In
New York City Housing Auth. v. Watson, 27 Misc. 2d 618, 207 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Sup.
Ct. 1960), the court held that a tenant could not be evicted because her husband had
been convicted of a crime and imprisoned.
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that it is a permissable [sic] condition of the receipt of the benefits of
public housing. They are kept on the short string by month-to-month
tenure . . . . [They have been] evicted without any statement of
reasons.
7 2
After three years of litigation, the unbridled discretion of the admin-
istrators of these projects has been substantially limited. A few examples
demonstrate the trend in judicial thinking.
Admission Procedures: On September 9, 1966, 31 persons brought a
class action under the Civil Rights Act challenging the admission pro-
cedures employed by the New York Housing Authority.7" As a group
they filed a total of 51 applications for admission, 36 in 1967 or earlier
and some as early as 1961. None had been advised at any time of his
eligibility or ineligibility for public housing.74
Primary among the complaints set forth were deficiencies in admis-
sion procedures: absence of regulations pertaining to admission require-
ments; failure to process applications chronologically or in accordance
with any ascertainable standards; the automatic expiration of all applica-
tions at the end of two years; the refusal to give credit for time passed to
renewal applications; and the lack of a waiting list or other information
from the housing authority regarding an applicant's status.75 Although it
was a case of the first instance, the court encountered little difficulty in
finding a claim upon which relief could be granted.
It hardly need be said that the existence of an absolute and uncon-
trolled discretion in an agency of government vested with the admin-
istration of a vast program, such as public housing, would be an in-
tolerable invitation to abuse. For this reason alone due process requires
that selection among applicants be made in accordance with "ascer-
tainable standards" . . . and, in cases where many candidates are equally
qualified under those standards, that further selections be made in some
reasonable manner .... 76
Subsequently, an action was brought in the southern district of New
York alleging that the housing authority was discriminating against
welfare recipients. 7 The court struck down the classification on equal
protection grounds, reviewed the selection system, and ordered its re-
'Fortas, Equal Rights-For Whom?, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 401, 412 (1967).
" Holmes v. New York City Housing Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).7 1 Id. at 264.7
r Id.
70 Id. at 265.
7 Colon v. Thompson Square Neighbors, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
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organization to meet due process standards, e.g., notification, chrono-
logical waiting lists, etc.71
The assertion of applicants' rights has not been limited to New York.
In early May of 1968, a class action was brought against the Philadelphia
Housing Authority alleging unconstitutional discrimination against fami-
lies having illegitimate children.79 The action was dismissed with prejudice
after the signing of a stipulation providing: (1) that the applications
of the plaintiffs would be approved; (2) that the housing authority would
no longer consider as a sole basis for denial of admission the presence
in the family of a child or children born out of wedlock; and (3) that
the authority's Standards would provide for written notice of the reason
for refusal of admission and allow appeal, for review purposes, to an
official other than the person who rejected the application."0
Evictions: Housing authorities have adopted a standard month-to-
month lease, which (as originally conceived) permits evictions to be
accomplished with the minimum of delay."' Prior to 1966 only nominal
interference from the courts was experienced. 2 On March 29 of that
"Id. at 109-11.
"Teasley v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., CCH POVERTY L. RFr. 2615.302
-(E.D. Pa. May 7, 1968), noted in CLEARINGH1ousE REV., May-June 1968, at 2.
CLEARINGHOUSE REV., May-June 1968, at 2.
s' For a definitive history of the provision see Rosen, supra note 63, at 185,
203-07.
8 For the proposition that no reasons need be given for eviction see Brand v.
Chicago Housing Auth., 120 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1941); Walton v. City of Phoenix,
69 Ariz. 26, 208 P.2d 309 (1949); Chicago Housing Auth. v. Ivory, 341 Ill. App.
282, 93 N.E.2d 386 (1950); Municipal Housing Auth. v. Walck, 277 App. Div. 791,
97 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1950); Columbus Met. Housing Auth. v. Simpson, 85 Ohio
App. 73, 85 N.E.2d 560 (1949); Columbus Met. Housing Auth. v. Stires, 84
Ohio App. 331, 84 N.E.2d 296 (1949); Housing Auth. v. Turner, 201 Pa. Super.
62, 191 A.2d 869 (1963).
Some case law to the contrary was developed after the Gwinn Amendment was
attached as a rider to the Independent Offices Appropriations Act of 1953 and 1954.
Act of July 5, 1952, ch. 578, 66 Stat. 403, reenacted by Act of July 31, 1953, ch.
302, 67 Stat. 307. It provided, inter alia: "[N]o housing unit constructed under
the United States Housing Act ... shall be occupied by a person who is a mem-
ber of an organization designated as subversive by the Attorney General." All cases
involving the application of the provision have held it unenforceable. Rudder v.
United' States, 226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Housing Auth. v. Cordova, 130
Cal. App. 2d 883, 279 P.2d 215 (App. Dep't 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 969
(1956); Chicago Housing Auth. v. Blackman, 4 Ill. 2d 319, 122 N.E.2d -522
(1954); Kutcher v. Housing Auth., 20 N.J. 181, 119 A.2d 1 (1955); Peters v.
New York Housing Auth., 9 Misc. 2d 942, 128 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct. 1953),
modified, 283 App. Div. 801, 128 N.Y.S.2d 712, rev'd on other grounds, 307 N.Y.
519, 121 N.E.2d 529 (1954), appeal dismissed on remand, 1 App. Div. 2d 694,
147 N.Y.S. 859 (1955) ; Lawson v. Housing Auth., 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605,
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955). Although these cases, either explicitly or im-
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year, Mr. and Mrs. Bennie Vinson were given notice of eviction from
their apartment by the Greenburgh (N.Y.) Housing Authority. No
reason was given other than an oral disclosure on behalf of the authority
that Mrs. Vinson and her children would be permitted to remain if she
compelled her husband to leave the apartment and then sought public
welfare assistance and an order of support. Upon her refusal to force him
to leave, summary eviction proceedings were brought. The trial court
dismissed the proceeding citing the authority's "irresponsibility."' On
appeal the decision was affirmed. As a threshold matter the court made a
realistic appraisal of a housing authority's special responsibilities to those
it is designed to serve:
[I]t must be acknowledged that the housing authority prescribes terms
of the lease and that the tenant does not negotiate with the authority
in the usual sense.... In this condition of affairs, to impose a require-
ment of good faith and reasonableness on the party in the strong bar-
gaining position when he exerts a contractual option is but a reflection
of simple justice ....
The eviction of a family in the income bracket eligible under the stan-
dards of public housing from its household is a serious blow. If, in fact,
a mistake has been made in the accusation against the tenants of im-
proper conduct or a violation of regulations, or if the reason for the
ouster has no better basis than dislike or unjustified discipline, the
requirement of the disclosure of the ground for termination of the lease
affords the tenant the opportunity to protest its exercise. On the other
hand, the authority will suffer no more than delay in the ultimate
eviction in the event the termination of the lease is made on reason-
able grounds; and in the meantime the authority may control excessive
misbehavior of the tenant through police action.84
Sociological implications, however, were far exceeded by the court's
analysis of applicable constitutional limitations:
"Due process of law," is not confined to judicial proceedings, but
extends to every case which may deprive a citizen of Life, Liberty, or
plicitly, held housing authorities to a higher standard of conduct than a private
landlord, their rationale was limited to the specific context of cases arising under
the Gwinn Amendment. Housing Auth. v. Turner, 210 Pa. Super. 62, 191 A.2d
869 (1963) (reaffirming the proposition that eviction can be for no reason at
all); accord, Housing Auth. v. Venezie, 25 BEAVER Co. L.J. 92 (Pa. Ct. C.P.
1963). Contra, Holt v. Richmond Redev. & Housing Auth., 266 F. Supp. 397 (E.D.
Va. 1966).
"Vinson v. Greenburgh Housing Auth., 29 App. Div. 2d 338, 339-40, 288
N.Y.S.2d 159, 162 (1968).,.
"Id. at 341-42, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 164.
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Property, whether the proceeding be judicial, administrative, or execu-
tive in nature .... Once a State embarks into the area of housing
as a function of government, necessarily that function, like other gov-
ernment functions, is subject to constitutional commands . . . . Low
rent housing ... imports a status of a continuous character, based on
the need of the tenants for decent housing at a cost proportionate to
their income, subject to the compliance of rent when due. "The Gov-
ernment as landlord is still the government. It must not act arbi-
trarily, for, unlike private landlords, it is subject to the requirements
of due process of law."85
Other courts have questioned the constitutionality of the thirty-day
eviction process on different grounds. For instance, when a Louisville,
Kentucky, tenant was evicted without reason, the court held that the
one-month lease created an "estate" in realty. Accordingly, the housing
authority was held to have created a property interest that was protected
by the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment.86 Later, in a similar case, the northern district of Texas issued a
temporary injunction restraining eviction proceedings, called for a "fair
hearing" on the issues of reasons for eviction, and concluded that both
the equal protection and due process clauses had been violated by the
authority's summary procedure.
8 7
Paralleling these "minor skirmishes" was the war between Mrs. Joyce
Thorpe and the Durham (N.C.) Housing Authority.8" Mrs. Thorpe was
elected president of a tenant's association on August 10, 1965. The next
day her lease was cancelled; no reason was given."" It was argued that
her case raised distinct constitutional issues: first, her eviction was in-
valid per se because it was designed to suppress or to retaliate against
the exercise of her first amendment freedoms; second, the due process
clause gave her, as a public housing tenant, the right to notice of the
reasons for eviction. She also argued that she had a right to a "due
process hearing" in a public housing eviction proceeding.
While the case was in litigation, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) issued a circular requiring that tenants be
8 Id. at 340-41, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 163-64.
8 Louisville Mun. Housing Comm'n v. Murphey, CCH POVERTY L. REP.
2245.20 (Ky. Cir. Ct., Jefferson County 1967), twted in WELPARE L. BULL., Jan.
1968, at 5.
"' Quevedo v. Collins, CCH POvERTY L. REP. 2245.35, at 3148 (N.D. Tex.
July 12, 1968).
"B See Thorpe v. Durham Housing Auth., 89 S. Ct. 518 (1969).
89 Id. at 520.
given notice of the reasons for eviction and opportunity to reply.90 Two
years later, and after two hearings before both the North Carolina Su-
preme Court and United States Supreme Court,91 the United States
Supreme Court decided the case on the basis of the circular. Mrs. Thorpe
had retained possession of her apartment throughout the litigation; the
circular applied to all tenants presently residing in federal-funded public
housing; a fortiori, if Mrs. Thorpe were to be evicted the procedure
utilized must comply with the HUD directive.92 By basing its decision
upon the circular, it became unnecessary for the Court to determine the
constitutional issues.
An analysis of the case, however, reveals the Court's concern with
the constitutional issues involved. When first heard (and remanded to
the state court for further proceedings), Mr. Justice Douglas, concurred,
stating:
It is not dispositive to maintain that a private landlord might terminate
a lease at his pleasure. For this is government we are dealing with and
the actions of government are circumscribed by the Bill of Rights and
the Fourteenth Amendment. 93
On final hearing the Court noted that a tenant would have considerable
difficulty effectively defending against an illegal eviction if the authority
were under no obligation to disclose its reasons, and cited Justice Douglas'
concurrence. 4 The Court also noted with approval the authority's con-
cession that the power to evict was limited to the extent that it could
not be exercised against those who engaged in constitutionally-protected
o The circular provided:
Within the past year, increasing dissatisfaction has been expressed with
eviction practices in public low-rent housing projects. During that period
a number of suits have been filed throughout the United States generally
challenging the right of a local authority to evict a tenant without advising
him of the reasons for such eviction. Since this is a federally assisted pro-
gram, we believe that it is essential that no tenant be given notice to
vacate without being told by the Local Authority . . . the reasons for the
eviction, and given an opportunity to make such reply or explanation as he
may wish. In addition to informing the tenant of the reason(s) for any
proposed eviction action, from this date each Local Authority shall maintain
a written record of every eviction from its federally assisted public housing.
Id. at 521 n.8.
" The course of Thorpe v. Durham Housing Auth. through the courts is
reported in 207 N.C. 431, 148 S.E.2d 290 (1966); 386 U.S. 670 (1967); 271 N.C.
468, 157 S.E.2d 147 (1967); 89 S. Ct. 518 (1969).
02 89 S. Ct. at 527.
D3 86 U.S. at 678.
9, 89 S. Ct. at 527 n.45.
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activity. 5 Compliance with the HUD circular by providing notice of
charges was deemed "essential to remove a serious impediment to the
successful protection of constitutional rights."
Although insisting on notification of reasons for eviction, the Court
declined to establish any guidelines for a hearing by the authority in the
event that the tenant challenged the reasons advanced for the eviction. 7
The Court concluded that, if the hearings were "inadequate," HUD could
well decide to implement guidelines for one that is "appropriate.""8 Cited
as an appropriate model were the provisions of 24 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-.12
(1968)." These sections establish a detailed procedure to dispose of com-
plaints of racial discrimination in federally assisted programs, including
independent investigation of complaints, full hearing on the record and
judicial review.
Private Housing
Public housing provides needed shelter for many of the nation's less
privileged. An estimated eight million families, however, are compelled
by segregation and poverty to live in the decaying slums of our central
cities.Y' Dilapidated conditions, exorbitant rents, and the adverse social
consequences of tenament housing are fully documented. 10 ' As sum-
marized by Mr. Justice Douglas:
The problem of housing for the poor is one of the most acute facing
the Nation. The poor are relegated to ghettos and are beset by sub-
standard housing at exorbitant rents. Because of their lack of bar-
gaining power, the poor are made to accept onerous lease terms. Sum-
mary eviction proceedings are the order of the day. Default judgements
in eviction proceedings are obtained with machine-gun rapidity, since
the indigent cannot afford counsel to defend. Housing laws often have




r Id. at 526 & n.44.
06 Id. at 526-27.
97 Id. at 527.
"Id. at 527 n.48.
go Id.
"' Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54
GEo. L.J. 519 (1966).
0
°LYF6R,1 THE AIRTIGHT CAGE (1966); SHOOR, SLuMs AND SOCIAL IN-
SkcURiTY (1964 ;° Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and
Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1254 (1966); Schier, Protecting the Interests of the
Indigent Tenant: Two Approaches, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 670 (1960).
... Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037, 1040 (1967) (Douglas, 3., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
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The National Conference on Law and Poverty concluded in 1965 that
a primary goal of expanded legal services must be to provide representa-
tion for those seeking adequate housing.'3 As a prerequisite, "[f] unda-
mental revision of the antiquated landlord-tenant law [through] ... legal
skill, time, perseverance, and freedom from retaliatory pressures" was
to be undertaken.0 4 Although lack of uniformity of housing and land-
lord tenant laws necessarily places jurisdictional restraints on the impact
of decided cases, it is clear that there have been attempts to meet this
challenge.
Enforcement of inequitable provisions in leases has been assailed
on the grounds that the leases were contracts of adhesion,105 violative of
"public policy,"'0° or in conflict with applicable statutes, housing and
sanitary codes.l °r The concept of an implied warranty of habitability has
been utilized in civil suits alleging injuries caused by defects in rented
premises."' 8 Allegations that injuries resulting from the landlord's failure
to maintain his premises in conformity with applicable housing regula-
tions have been held to state a cause of action. 9 The presence of rats
and vermin has been held to constitute a "constructive eviction," which
relieves the tenant of liability for the non-payment of rent."0 Action on
behalf of tenants has culminated in criminal actions against landlords
whose properties do not conform to housing codes."'
In the District of Columbia, efforts of the Neighborhood Legal Ser-
vices Program established two important precedents for the city's slum
dwellers. First, a tenant who reports housing code violations may not
lOSp. WALD, supra note 36, at 20.
1o'Id.1 See Galligan v. Arovitch, 421 Pa. 301, 219 A.2d 463 (1966) ; Haig v. Lynne-
wood Gardens, CCH POVERTY L. REP. 2110.74 (Pa. Ct. C.P., Montgomery County
1968).
"'E.g., 3175 Holding Corp. v. Schmidt, 150 Misc. 853, 270 N.Y.S. 853 (N.Y.
City Mun. Ct. 1934).
" E.g., Jones v. Scheetz, 242 A.2d 208 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968) ; cf. Edot Realty
Co. v. Levinson, 54 Misc. 2d 673, 283 N.Y.S.2d 232 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1967).
:LsE.g., Reitmeyer v. Sprecher, 431 Pa. 284, 243 A.2d 395 (1968).
... Kanelos v. Kettler, CCH PoVERTY L. REP. 9026 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 2, 1968).
.. Tri-City Credit Bureau v. Monje, CCH PoVERTY L. REP. 2215.55 (Cal.
Mun. Ct., San Francisco County 1967); see Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d
1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (App. Dep't 1967).
.. District of Columbia v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., CCH Povwavv L. REp.
2315.50 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1968), noted in WELFARE L. BULL., April 1968, at.
9; District of Columbia v. Brown, CCH POVERTY L. REP. 2315.28 (D.C. Ct. Gen.
Sess. 1967).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
be evicted for that reason.': 2 Second, a lease is unenforceable against
a tenant if, at the time it was entered into, the dwelling was in violation
of the housing code."3 In such cases, no suit for possession may be
brought. It is expected that these decisions will form the basis for similar
suits in other jurisdictions." 4
Even more significant than the resfilts accomplished by these decisions
was the receptiveness of the judiciary to a re-evaluation of tenant's rights
in light of the social realities of slum housing. For instance, in deciding
that "retaliatory evictions" were not to be countenanced in the District
of Columbia, Judge J. Skelly Wright concluded:
As judges, "we cannot shut our eyes to matters of public notoriety and
general cognizance. When we take our seats on the bench we are not
struck with blindness, and forbidden to know as judges what we see
as men." . . . [W]e have the responsibility to consider the social
context in which our decisions will have operational effect. In light of
the appalling condition and shortage of housing . . . , the expense of
moving, the inequality of bargaining power between tenant and land-
lord, and the social and economic importance of assuring at least
minimum standards in housing conditions, we do not hesitate to declare
that retaliatory eviction cannot be tolerated." 5
Similar considerations were employed by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in overruling previous decisions absolving the landlord
from liability for injuries caused by his failure to repair:
We must recognize the fact that . . . critical changes have taken place
economically and socially. Aware of such changes, we must realize
further that most frequently today the average prospective tenant vis-
a-vis the prospective landlord occupies a disadvantageous position.
Stark necessity very often forces a tenant into occupancy of premises
far from desirable and in a defective state of repair. The acute housing
... Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 37 U.S.L.W.
3247 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1969).
11 Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
. _A circuit court in Connecticut recently followed Brown v. Southall Realty
Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968), in holding that a lease is unen-
forceable if the premises were violative of the housing code when the lease was
entered. Jensen v. Salisbury, CCH POVERTY L. RiP. 2330.28 (Conn. Cir. Ct.
1968). In contradistinction, the courts have not voided leases where violations
occurred after rental of the property. See, e.g., Saunders v. First Nat'l Realty
Corp., CCH POVERTY L. REP. 2330.85 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
The retaliatory eviction prohibition expressed in Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d
687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), has been followed in Michigan. Watts v. Lyles, CCH Pov-
ERTY L. REP. 9028 (Mich. Comm. Ct. Feb. 28, 1968).
"
1 Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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shortage mandates that the average prospective tenant accede to the
demands of the prospective landlord as to conditions of rental which,
under ordinary conditions with housing available, the average tenant
would not and should not accept.
No longer does the average prospective tenant occupy a free bargain-
ing status and no longer do the average landlord-to-be and tenant-to-be
negotiate a lease on an "arm's length" basis. Premises which, under
normal circumstances, would be completely unattractive for rental are
now, by necessity, at a premium. If our law is to keep in tune with
our times we must recognize the present day inferior position of the
average tenant vis-A-vis the landlord when it comes to negotiating a
lease.'1 6
Consumer Protection
Since the poor have little money to spend, it is difficult for many
to understand that their problems in the consumer field require the ser-
vices of legal aid. The phenomenal expansion of installment buying,
accompanied by soliciting promises of "no money down" and "easy
credit," however, has produced what Senator Warren Magnuson describes
as "the dark side of the marketplace," where:
[T]he unscrupulous souls now reach deep into the ghettos and the
ranks of the uneducated and unsophisticated to extract large sums. A
rich new field was to be found in the mass exploitation of great num-
bers of the lower and middle classes who knew little about the traps
in contracts.11
David Caplovitz's landmark work reveals a commercial jungle "in which
exploitation and fraud are the norm rather than the exception.""' Indeed,
the extent of exploitation has been noted as being "greater than many of us
realize. To a large extent-and this may be a little strong to swallow at
first--consumer exploitation has replaced labor exploitation as the real
problem of our times.""'  And, of course, it is the low-income consumer
who suffers the greatest exploitation.
20
Briefly described, he is a member of a class that totals some twenty-
Reitmeyer v. Sprecher, 431 Pa. 284, 288, 243 A.2d 395, 398 (1968).
W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKETPLACE 61
(1968).
8 Preface to 1967 edition of D. CAPLOViTZ, THE POOR PAY MoRE at xviii
(1967).
... W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, supra note 117, at 56 (quoting Sidney Mar-
golis).
1" For an analysis of these consumers, see St. Thomas More Institute on Legal
Research, Law and the Ghetto Consumer, 14 CATe. U.L. REv. 214 (1965).
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six million persons; for him credit is an economic necessity, not a rational
choice; he has no "rating" from the local credit bureau and therefore
grants "security interests" to the seller; he borrows goods, not money; he
is geographically immoble and lacks consumer sophistication; and his
ignorance and inability to buy elsewhere render contract terms meaning-
less or unimportant. He is an ideal prey for those who practice exploita-
tion.
Illustrative of these conditions are the operations of the New York
Jewelry Company located in the District of Columbia. As described by the
Federal Trade Commission, it is patronized by those who:
[HI] old extremely low-paying jobs, have no bank accounts or charge
accounts, and do not own their own home. Many of its customers are
Negro. .. . [I]ts advertising specifically appeals to those people who
cannot obtain credit elsewhere or who have lost their credit .... 121
The company has been in business twenty-five years. Its success is exem-
plified by the calendar year 1965 when it had a total sales volume of
355,000 dollars and gross profits of 310,529 dollars.122 Merchandise
includes eyeglasses, watches, jewelry, radios, and used television sets.
These are sold at "bargain" prices and with "easy credit" to enable the
customers to enjoy the "good things in life" that they could not otherwise
afford." On December 8, 1968, however, the FTC found that New York
Jewelry's method of helping their customers did not square with the
requirements of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
"Free eye examinations" and "complete eyeglasses including lenses
and frame" were advertised for $7.50.124 A tabulation showed that
90 percent of sales were for more than 23 dollars with only one pair sell-
ing for less than 17 dollars. 125 Put another way, 17 percent of sales were
at $79.50 and 72 percent in excess of 39 dollars. 2 Far from being "dis-
counts," average sales were "in fact . . .202 percent of, or about twice
as high as the trade area prices."'127 Sales of watches produced even more
dramatic figures.
[T]icketed prices for Bulova watches represented markups averaging
700%o in contrast to the trade area markup of approximately 100%.
... Leon A. Taschof, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 18,606 (F.T.C. 1968).
222 Id. at 20,943.12Id.
2'" Id. at 20,944.
'5 Id. at 20,946.
2'2 Id.
1" Id. at 20,948.,
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For example, one invoice in the record covering 8 different models of
Bulova watches which had cost the respondent from $16 to $28 indi-
cates sales proceeds by respondent on these items ranging from $125
to $149.50.128
Similar pricing practices-typified by transitor radios costing $3.45 be-
ing listed at $59.50-were common. 2 9
The "bargains" offered by the company, however, were not limited
to merchandise. Having decided to make a purchase, a customer was
offered "easy credit" through one of four different installment contracts
carrying annual interest rates of 53 percent, 67 percent, 47 percent, and
124 percent respectively.' The consequences which followed for those
whom the company called its "AAA-1 Preferred Customers"'' were
clear:
The record contains stipulated evidence that during 1964, for example,
New York Jewelry filed 1178 laws suits against defaulting customers.
In 1965 respondent filed 1631 such law suits and in 1966, 707. As for
garnishment proceedings, it was stipulated that in the 14-month period
January 1966 through February 1967 New York Jewelry filed 411
garnishment proceedings. For purposes of comparison, it was further
stipulated that the C & P Telephone Company during the same 14-month
period had only 91 garnishment proceedings, the Hecht Company 217,
Kay Jewelers (with 10 branch stores in the Washington area) 202, and
Reliable Stores Corporation 305. All of these stores undoubtedly had
many times more customers than the respondent's 5000.132
Put more concisely: the New York Jewelry Company sued about one
out of every three customers.' 33 Reviewing the overall operation of the
store, the Commission delineated what it considered the proper scope of
business ethics for the ghetto merchant:
At first blush these allegations in the complaint respecting respondent's
eligibility and collection practices might appear to rest on a premise
that it is illegal or somehow wrong or unfair for a retailer to adopt
a generous policy with respect to the extension of credit. We reject
any such a premise. To even suggest the validity of such a premise
would carry particularly harsh overtones for our nation today when we
are so tragically aware of the almost twenty-six million people in our
228 Id. at 20,954.
2 
' Id. at 20,955 n.40.
Ia8 Id. at 20,950.
111 Id. at 20,944. The Commission attached an appendix showing a "customer
profile" which vividly portrays the lot of the low-income consumer. Id. at 20,960.2 Id. at 20,956.
133 Id.
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country who are living below or just at the poverty line and who can
only hope to acquire even the bare necessities of life by purchasing on
time, much less any of the other goods and services so consistently
advertised in every media as being part of the good life in our society.
The need in our nation is for more reasonable credit eligibility criteria
and for greater availability of credit in many areas of our economy.
Nor do these complaint allegations proceed on any notion that buyers-
and particularly low-income consumers-are under no obligation to
exercise self-restraint and responsibility for their own actions. No one
has suggested that the law merchant should be suspended because a
customer comes from the low-income segment of our society. A re-
tailer's credit eligibility and collection practices as such are not the
thrust of this charge in the complaint.
On the other hand, it is manifestly unfair to adopt a marketing policy
which has the effect of luring unsophisticated customers into entering
contractual obligations which in all likelihood they have little under-
standing of, by convincing them that the credit is "easy" and prices
are low and at the same time following a rigid collection policy resulting
in default judgments and garnishments being levied against their
meager wages. 134
The intrusion of the FTC into business practices such as those of
the New York Jewelry Company has been rare. For the legal services
attorney, however, similar operations have not been uncommon. Operating
within a framework of established contract law outstripped by the credit
revolution,' 35 he has protected clients from the holder in due course
doctrine,136 sought to apply usury laws to certain "finance" and "carrying"
1" Id. at 20,956-57.
. The inappropriateness of contract law in the credit revolution is definitively
analyzed by Magnuson and Carper:
Our whole legal doctrine which governs contracts is based on a presumption
that both parties are of equal ability to realize the consequences of the trans-
action and fulfill them. At a time when the credit-buying system was highly
sophisticated and those trading with each other were usually businessmen
and usually on equal footing with each other, it was reasonable to expect
credit buyers to exercise match-wits caution. Rare was the man forty years
ago who completed a big transaction without days to study papers, usually
with the help of an attorney. Today, millions sign installment contracts of
tremendous legal consequences, often without reading or understanding them,
after only ten minutes thought. It is ludicrous to suppose that a buyer with
no knowledge of the law is on a par with a dealer whose sophisticated
lawyers have meticulously worded the contract to the undisputed advantage
of the seller. Yet the law continues to operate as if the credit revolution
wrought no changes at all in the buyer-seller relationship, as if at one time
equality exists.
W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, supra note 117, at 69.
" The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302 defines holder in due course as one
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charges,'3" attacked the validity of collection practices 38 and garnishment
proceedings,'3 9 and brought many deceptive sales practices into the open.1 40
Sanctions imposed in many of these cases have vastly improved the
who takes an instrument for value, in good faith, and without notice that it is over-
due or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the part
of any person.
Legal aid attorneys have had some success in defeating a note creditor's im-
munity from claims or defenses by establishing participation in the underlying sales
transaction sufficient to strip him of holder in due course status. For example, in
the District of Columbia, a door-to-door salesman sold carpeting under a plan
whereby the buyer would obtain a credit on the purchase price for furnishing the
salesman with "leads" to prospective customers. The buyer was asked to sign a
purchase contract and a promissory note for 1,500 dollars. Referrals in fact did
not result in a credit to the purchase price. Investigation of the finance company
that purchased the contract and the note revealed that it had participated in the
transaction to such a degree that it was exposed to the defense arising out of the
misrepresentation as to credit for referrals. HIGHLrGHTS OF RECENT CASES, June
1968, at 11 (publication of Washington, D.C., Neighborhood Legal Services Pro-
gram). Accord, Financial Credit Corp. v. Williams, 246 Md. 575, 229 A.2d 712
(1967); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967) (both cases involve
investigations into the issue of whether there was a "good-faith" holder). For
orientation on the subject see Comment, Holder in Due Course-A Memo to
Poverty Lawyers, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 281 (1968).
"87 E.g., Greene v. Gulf Oil Corp., CCH POVERTY L. REP. 9308 (Ga. Ct. App.
1969) (handling charge); W.T. Grant Co. v. Walsh, 100 N.J. Super. 60, 241 A.2d
46 (Dist. Ct. Middlesex County 1948) (revolving credit applied to "coupon"
books). See generaUy Note, Usury and Consumer Credit, 70 W. VA. L. REv. 204
(1968).
"8 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Smithey, 426 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1968)
(damage for conversion-picking lock to building when repossessing); Cline v.
Flagler Sales Corp., 207 So. 2d 709 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (claim for false
imprisonment for arrest and detention of debtor); California v. Reynolds Metal
Co., CCH POVERTY L. REP. 3535.08 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Co., No. 925-
427, 1968) (collection agency enjoined from threatening wage attachments); Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Hitchcock, 158 S.E.2d 468 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967) (punitive
damages for "bad faith" repossession); Hileman v. Harter Bank & Trust Co.,
174 Ohio St. 95, 186 N.E.2d 853 (1962) (clause in contract authorizing "breaking
and entering" against public policy).
" In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 295,
petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3003 (July 2, 1968) (No. 130), the constitu-
tionality of garnishment proceedings was tested for the first time. It was con-
tended, inter alia, that the procedure used in Wisconsin for pre-judgment garnish-
ment deprived the wage earner of due process inasmuch as, before the garnish-
ment, there was no right to notice and hearing or other procedure to challenge the
legality of the garnishment.
140 Bait advertising consists of offering to sell a product or service that the
seller does not want or intend to sell in order to attract customers to some other,
usually more expensive, product. For instance, the advertisement of employment
opportunities has been found to be a type of "bait" when the advertiser is seeking
students for instruction. Vogue Models, Inc. v. Tribett, CCH POVERTY L. REp.
3705.17 (IIl. Cir. Ct. 1st Munic. Dist. No. 67 MI 526081, 1967). Automobile ser-
vices, California v. Edgewood Auto Center, Inc., CCH POVE'rT L. REP. 1 3705.05
(Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles Co., No. 906457, 1967), and the selling of home
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situation of the unwary consumer. They have not, however, resulted
in a noticeable change in the hallowed and time-honored concept of
"freedom of contract." It is this tradition that, when placed in the con-
text of many modem merchandising techniques, allows and condones
larceny in the market-place. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co.,14 1 however, may furnish the necessary precedent in some jurisdictions
for the granting of judicial relief to those who are victims of the un-
scrupulous.
Mrs. Williams, a welfare recipient, purchased a stereo set and added
it to her account under a printed form contract providing for installment
payments.142 The contract contained a provision that kept a balance due
on every item purchased until the balance due on all items, whenever pur-
chased, was liquidated. 14 3 Under this provision, the debt incurred at the
time of purchase of each item was secured by the right to repossess all
items previously purchased. Mrs. Williams had made purchases for a
period of roughly three years. When she defaulted on her payment for
the stereo the store "retrieved every item it could lay its hands on. '144
In striking down the contract under a common law doctrine of "un-
conscionability," the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia set
forth broad guidelines to be utilized in determining the validity of such
contracts:
Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an ab-
sence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together
with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other
party. Whether a meaningful choice is present in a particular case
can, only be determined by consideration of all the circumstances
surrounding the transaction. In many cases the meaningfulness of the
choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power. The man-
improvement products or services, Matter of People of State of New York, CCH
POVERTY L. REP. 3705.25, 158 N.Y.L.J. No. 10, p. 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967), are
also areas where bait advertising has been observed.
Selling used or rebuilt goods as new has been subject to sanction, J. Truett
Payne Co. v. Jackson, 203 So. 2d 443 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1967), as well as the tech-
nique of "referral selling" which the buyer is led to believe that he can pay for
all or part of the service or product through commissions on sales made to persons
whose names he submits as prospective customers. M. Lippincott Mtg. Inv. Co.
v. Childress, 204 So. 2d 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Lefkowitz v. I.T.M., Inc.,
52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
'1 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
' Id. at 447.
1 Id.
.. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U
PA. L. REv, 485, -552 (1967).
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ner in which the contract was entered is also relevant to this con-
sideration. Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious edu-
cation or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to understand the
terms of the contract, or were the important terms hidden in a maze
of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices? Ordinarily,
one who signs an agreement without full knowledge of its terms might
be held to assume the risk that he has entered a one-sided bargain.
But when a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real
choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no
knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an
objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all the terms.
In such a case the usual rule that the terms of the agreement are not to
be questioned should be abandoned and the court should consider
whether the terms of the contract are so unfair that enforcement
should be withheld.
In determining reasonableness or fairness, the primary concern must
be with the terms of the contract considered in light of the circum-
stances existing when the contract was made. The test is not simple,
nor can it be mechanically applied. The terms are to be considered
"in the light of the general commercial background and the commercial
needs of the particular trade or case." Corbin suggests the test as
being whether the terms are "so extreme as to appear unconscionable
according to the mores and business practices of the time and place."
• . . We think this formulation correctly states the test to be applied
in those cases where no meaningful choice was exercised upon enter-
ing the contract. 1.45
The progeny of Williams 14 have brought into the judicial limelight
even more glaring examples of commercial exploitation. It is expected
that the decision will afford needed protection from overreaching by the
unscrupulous.
350 F.2d at 449-50.
A district court in Nassau County, New York, refused to enforce a contract
for 1,146 dollars for a refrigerator freezer worth 348 dollars. Frostifresh Corp. v.
Reynosa, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966). In New Jersey, a
superior court was "shocked" by the sale of a 300 dollar freezer for 1,093 dollars,
and r~fused to enforce the contract. Toker v. Pearl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 502, 247
A.2d 701, 703 (Super. Ct. 1968). Summary judgment in favor of a finance com-
pany was refused in light of the fact that a car sold for 940 dollars with credit
charges of 242 dollars required 570 dollars worth of repairs the week after it was
sold. Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez, 53 Misc. 2d 620, 297 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Cir.
Ct. 1967). Finally, a Florida court concluded that "unconscionability" amounts to
"fraud" and refused to enforce a contract for plumbing services totaling 2,600
d6llafs where the value of the goods and services was 921 dollars. Gulf Shore
Dredging Co. v. Hutto, CCH POVERTY L. REP. 9052 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1968). "
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Welfare
The welfare system has done little to wipe out the extreme poverty
of some ten percent of our nation.147 Payments are below "minimum sub-
sistence" in many states, 14 and an estimated one-half of those eligible for
welfare either do not qualify (in spite of "need") under the morass of
restrictive eligibility rules or have not applied out of pride, ignorance, or
fear.149 Moreover, an all-pervasive local concern lest money be wrong-
fully received has forced some recipients to forfeit rights of privacy and
dignity and receive in their place personal control of their lives by the local
caseworker 50 as the price for obtaining assistance. As observed by the Na-
tional Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders: "The welfare system
is designed to save money instead of people and tragically ends up doing
neither."''
In 1965 the issue was clearly posed: could the legal services attorney
work within a system admitted by most to be either outdated or mis-
managed and, through the "test case" technique, aid in securing for
many the assistance to which they were entitled under law? In addition,
could legal aid attorneys secure judicial protection of the privacy of
recipients? A description of the cases that have been litigated provides
an insight into our present welfare system and the injustices that it has
perpetrated on our nation's poor.
The Social Security Act has long required "opportunity for a fair
hearing" both in the denial of applications and in the termination of
benefits. 52 The "opportunity" has received minimal interpretation. It
has not meant the right to know before a requested post-termination
17 Not including the aged, in 1966 there were, in the United States, approxi-
mately 21.7 million persons below the "poverty level" as defined by the Social
Security Administration. RIOT COMMISSION REPORT 458.
148 Id.
... Hearings Before a Subcomin. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 821 (1968).
...See Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal
Issiutes, 74 YALE L.J. 1244, 1247-48 (1965); Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches
and the Social Security Act, 72 YAu.E L.J. 1347 (1963).
... RIOT COMMISSION REPORT 457 (quoting Mitchell Ginsberg, former head of
the New York City Welfare Department).
... The categorical public assistance programs of the Social Security Act require
a state plan to provide for the opportunity for a fair hearing before the admin-
istering agency for any individual whose claim for assistance is denied or is not
acted on promptly. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) (4), 1202(a) (4) (1964). Federal inter-
pretation of this requirement can be found in DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCA-
TION, AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION pt. IV,
§§ 6100, 6300(c) (1968). -
hearing exactly what rules and evidence the department relied upon; it
has not meant notice of the exact issues considered relevant; it has not
meant a right to counsel at the hearing (the recipient could, of course,
"employ" counsel); it has not meant that the recipient had a right to
confront and examine witnesses; and it has not meant the right of access
to department records that affect the case (including records of prior
cases) .153
Mrs. Esther Lett, an AFDC mother in New York City, lay on the
tile floor of the welfare center where minutes before she had fainted.
She had not eaten all day and had come to the center to ask for emergency
aid.154 She and her four children had for a month lived solely on the
handouts of neighbors; nine days before, they were forced to go to the
hospital with severe diarrhea-that day they had only a spoiled chicken
to eat, donated by a neighbor. 5'
Mrs. Lett had been a welfare recipient in "good standing," but one
of her neighbors erroneously thought she was working and reported her
to the department. The department, without notice, terminated her pay-
ments. Efforts by legal aid secured promises that payments would be
resumed. She had come to the center to beg emergency assistance for
food. When she awoke she was told immediate aid was impossible: it
had not been "authorized."15
Mrs. Velez and her four small children had been on welfare since her
husband left home. The landlady told the welfare department that Mrs.
Velez's husband had been visiting every night. The department, without
notice, terminated her payments. Without welfare, she could not pay the
rent, and she and her children were shortly evicted. They moved in with
her sister who had nine children and was on relief. The thirteen children
and the two mothers lived in a cramped apartment for four months.
Poorly fed, when fed at all, Mrs. Velez's children soon lost weight and be-
came ill. After four months the welfare department documented the fact
that Mr. Velez had never visited his wife at night and reinstated her
payments. 1
57
.. See Burrus & Fessler, Constitutional Due Process Hearing Requirements
in the Administration of Public Assistance: The District of Columbia Experience,
16 Am. U.L. REv. 199 (1967); Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare
Practices, 67 CoLum. L. ZEv. 84 (1967).
"' Kelly v. Wyman, CCH PovEavR L. REP. 9134, at 10,258 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
215 Id.
436 Id.
107 Id. at 10,258-59.
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Mrs. Lett and Mrs. Velez were two of thirteen plaintiffs who appeared
before a three-judge court in New York asking that welfare payments not
be terminated without a prior hearing. The state cited a "pressing need"
to protect the public's tax revenues that in itself justified a departure from
the general standard of a "requisite due process . . .hearing before the
final order becomes effective."'' 8 The court, however, refused to accept
the state's argument:
Against the justified desire to protect public funds must be
weighed the individual's overpowering need in this unique situation
not to be wrongfully deprived of assistance, and the startling statistic
that post-termination fair hearings apparently override prior decisions
to terminate benefits in a substantial number of cases. The obvious
fact is that there is no way truly to make whole a recipient like Mrs.
Velez for the indignity of living with her sister and thirteen children
in one apartment because of a wrongful termination. The equally
obvious remedy is to take greater care to prevent such injustice before
it occurs. While the problem of additional expense must be kept in
mind, it does not justify denying a hearing meeting the ordinary stan-
dards of due process. Under all the circumstances, we hold that due
process requires an adequate hearing before termination of welfare
benefits .... 15
Subsequently, an order was issued requiring, inter alia, adequate notice,
a full hearing with the right of cross-examining witnesses, and an in-
dependent review of decisions within the welfare department prior to
termination of benefits.' 60
Other areas in which harsh procedural practices place the recipient
at a disadvantage have also been under attack.' 61 Added to these "pro-
cedural due process" problems of recipients are the restrictive regula-
tions that inflict indignities on their daily lives. One such indignity is
the conditioning of welfare benefits on the recipient's giving his "consent"
to the search of his home. Administrative utilization of such "consent"
lrs Id. at 10,259.
"'Id. at 10,259-60.
"Id. 9223, at 10,437. Cf. McCullough v. Terzian, CCH POVERTY L. REp.
1610.055 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 2, 1968). Contra, Wheeler v. Montgomery, CCH
POVERTY L. REP. 1610.052 (N.D. Cal. 1968), appeal docketed, No. 634, Oct. 11,
1968.
... See Robinson v. Board of Comm'rs, CdH POVERTY L. REP. 1320.153 (D.C.
Dist. Ct. 1967), reported in WELFARE L. BULL., Oct. 1967, at 8 (access to regula-
tions and decisions); It re Cave & Rodriquez, CCH POVERTY L. REP. 1600.021(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), reported in CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY & LAW,
PROGRESs REPORT SUMMARY 10-11 (undated) (examination of written evidence
relied upon); Stacy v. Ashland County Dep't of Public Welfare, 39 Wis. 2d 595,
159 N.W.2d 630 (1968) (right to judicial review).
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is exemplified by a recent case arising in Alameda County, California.
A social worker was discharged for his refusal to participate in an early
morning "mass raid" to determine the continuing eligibility of recipients.
In ordering reinstatement, the Supreme Court of California -found that
the coercive means of obtaining. the constitutional waiver, i.e., withholding
of money unless the waiver' were given, rendered it invalid and that the
mass searches were clearly unconstitutional.1 2  Subsequently, several
actions in behalf of recipients were undertaken elsewhere in the United
States to have such "home visits" declared unconstitutional.'.
The administration of the dependent children provisiois of the Social
Security Act (AFDC) provide further illustrations of 'harsh, procedural
practices. Briefly, a dependent'child, in addition to being'needy, must'bl
deprived of parental support by reason of the death, continued absene, o
physical or mental incapacity of the parent to be eligible for assistance.""
Some states have adopted optional "unemployed father" provisions that
further define a dependent child as one whose need arises fi-om the
deprivation of parental support by reason of the unemployment of* his
father.'65 In states having no such provision, a father must desert his
family in order that his children may receive AFDC payments. 6
The requirement is commonly termed the "man in the house" rule."'
""Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm., 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr.
623 (1967). The basis for such activity on the part of the welfare departments is
the requirement for "redeterminations" of continuing eligibility on the part of
recipients ranging from every six to twelve months. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDU-
CATION, AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC ASSISTANcE ADMINISTRATION, Pt.
IV, § 2200(d) (1968).
E.g., Stewart v. Washington, CCH POVERTY L. REP. 1120.151 (D.C. Dist.
Ct. 1968); Bradley v. Ginsberg, CCH POvERTY L. REP. 1120.10 (S.D.N.Y,
1967).
...42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1964).
'or Id.
1.. Traditionally, benefits have been denied to families if the husband is
present and "employable" (whether or not he can get a job). Unemployed
husbands therefore "desert," and mothers may then get on relief (if they
agree to sue for nonsupport). But often the men remain near the families,
despite the danger of being apprehended and jailed for nonsupport. Welfare
departments maintain squads of investigators who track down these men,
sometimes by invading homes between midnight and dawn without war-
rants ..... An especially vicious feature of the rules is that if a case-
worker judges that such a man "appears" to exist, the burden of proving
that he is not a "substitute" father falls on the mother.
P. GOOD, THE AMERICAN SERFS 166 n.8 (1968) (quoting from Cloward & Piven
in the NEw REPUBLIc, Aug. 5, 1967).1 Q7 See note 166 supra. See also Sparer, Social Welfare Law Testing, 12 PRAc.
LAw. (No. 4) 15 (1966).
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A second variation is known as the "substitute father" regulation. Under
such provisions, children are denied aid if the father is in the home, or if
they have an alleged "substitute father"--a man who cohabits with the
mother either in or out of the home. 118 The issue of whether the children
actually receive support from this individual is irrelevant.
After a clear showing that an alleged "substitute father" was not
legally obligated, and in fact refused, to give needed support, an action
was brought seeking to have Alabama's regulation declared to be in
violation of the equal protection clause and in conflict with the Social
Security Act.'69 The state's argument was premised on its interest in
discouraging immorality.' The Supreme Court, however, found that
the term "parent" as used in the act meant an individual who was under
a state-recognized duty of support and that:
Congress has determined that immorality and illegitimacy should be
dealt with through rehabilitative measures rather than measures that
punish dependent children, and that protection of such children is the
paramount goal of AFDC.
All responsible governmental agencies in the Nation today recognize
the enormity and pervasiveness of social ills caused by poverty. The
causes of and cures for poverty are currently the subject of much debate.
We hold today only that Congress has made at least this one deter-
mination: that destitute children who are legally fatherless cannot be
flatly denied federally funded assistance on the transparent fiction that
they have a substitute father. 17'
Mr. Justice Douglas concurred, finding that any system which penalized
children for the sins of their mother was clearly a violation of the equal
protection clause' 72
Other imaginative regulations have also come before the courts.
Although one objective of the AFDC program is the strengthening of
family life through care of dependent children in their own homes, many
states have promulgated "employable mother" regulations that require
able mothers to leave the home for employment. 17 The rule in Georgia,
... Sparer, supra note 167, at 16.
"' King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
70 Id. at 318.
171 Id. at 325, 334.
'"Id. at 336. But cf. Lewis v. Stark, CCH POVERTY L. REP. 9299 (N.D. Cal.
1968) ; see also Tartaglio v. Department of Institutions & Agencies, noted it; CCH
POVERTY L. REP. 1320.051 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. 1968).
""See generally Rosenheim, Vagrancy Concepts in Welfare Law, 54 CALirX. L.
REV. 511, 548-52 (1966).
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for example, not only required all "able-bodied" mothers not needed in
the home to seek and accept "suitable" employment,'74 but also defined
certain periods of the year as periods of "full employment," during which
the welfare department automatically closed out all current cases and
denied all applications. The seasons were those in which there was a
great demand for cheap field labor." 5
The rule did not take into account whether a recipient could actually
find employment, or if she did so, whether full employment paid as much
as she was entitled to receive under welfare. The welfare regulations also
denied any supplementation to the "fully-employed" mothers even if it
were clear that they were working for less than minimum wages and
often receiving less than they would under welfare."'
A Negro mother of seven sought to have the regulation declared un-
constitutional. Prior to the hearing Georgia modified the rule by allowing
some supplementation of full-time employment income where the employ-
ment income did not cover the pre-employment welfare budget. The court,
however, found the supplementation scheme (like the former one of no
supplementation) a denial of equal protection inasmuch as it gave less
to the recipient whose extra "source" of income was employment than
to one whose "source" was something other than employment. Con-
cluding, the court also required that before aid could be terminated or
reduced, a bona-fide offer of employment, which a mother could for "good
(cause" refuse, be shown.17
An equally troublesome area in the AFDC program is the maximum
grant limitation. As administered, each state calculates payments to
families according to the number of dependent children. Some states,
however, limit the lump-sum payment that any one family may receive.
As a result, an absolute ceiling is established without regard to how needy
the family is or how many children it has. Moreover, since federal regu-
lations permit children to live with specified relatives and still be eligible
for AFDC, it is apparent that dollar limitations on grants may en-
courage families to "distribute" children among other relatives.:' s The
17 Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUm. L.
Rtv. 84, 88-89 (1967).17 Anderson v. Schaefer, CCtI PovERTY L. REP. 1220.301, at 2193 (N.D. Ga.
April 5, 1968).
176 Id.177 Id.178 See, e.g., Comment, Welfare's "Condition X;" 76 YALn L.J. 1222, 1222-23
(1967).
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result squarely conflicts with the Act's purpose of maintaining "continued
parental care and protection."' 0
A three-judge district court in Maryland recently held that the
state's "maximum grant" limitation was inconsistent with the Social
Security Act and violated the equal protection clause. 8 In doing so, the
court delineated the irregularities resulting from its enforcement:
That the maximum grant regulation is offensive is easily demon-
strable. AFDC is a program to provide support for dependent chil-
dren. By the standards of need set by Maryland, a dependent child is
in as great need and as deserving of aid, whether he be the fourth or
the eighth child of a family unit, although if the latter, the amount of
his need may not be quite as great as that of the former, because it is
cheaper to provide clothing, food and shelter for the eighth child than
for the fourth. Yet, the maximum grant regulation, in accomplishing its
purpose of conservation of inadequate resources assumes that a child
because he is the eighth (or any other number where to grant him
benefits would bring the aggregate benefits to the family unit over the
maximum grant) is either not in need or that his need must go un-
satisfied. Reason and logic will not support such a result. The fact
that such a child, if moved to the home of an eligible relative, may
receive such benefits lends additional support to this conclusion. In
effect, Maryland impermissibly conditions his eligibility for benefits
upon the relinquishment of the parent-child relationship. We hold,
therefore, that maximum grant regulation transgresses the equal pro-
tection clause.""'
These cases provide only surface indicia of the many issues which have
been raised in the past three years.'82 Their effect has been to change the
status of welfare recipients from objects of charity to citizens asserting
rights under the laws of the land.
Not all of the cases discussed here were brought by legal aid programs.
The NAACP, the ACLU, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964).
180Williams v. Dandridge, CCH PoVERTY L. REP. 9233 (D. Md. Dec. 13,
1968).
"Id. at 10,454.
"'. Legal aid attorneys have attacked other welfare regulations productive of in-
equity and arbitrar'iness in the system. E.g., Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331
(D. Conn. 1967), prob. juris. noted, 389 U.S. 1032 (1968) (No. 813, 1967 Term;
reniumbered No. 9, 1968 Term), (residency requirement for eligiblity held unconsti-
tutional) ; Williams v. Shapiro, 4 Conn. Cir. 449, 234 A.2d 376 (1967) (state rule
denying eligibility to persons with life insurance of a cash surrender value greater
than 250 dollars, held constitutional) ; In re Cager, - Md. -, 248 A.2d 384 (1968)
'(state may riot deny AFDC assistance to dependent children on grounds of their
mother's immorality), citing King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
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Under Law, and other organizations have particiapted in the struggle.
Much of the credit belongs to the legal services programs, however, not
only because of their participation in many of the cases, but because of
the new sense of direction that they have imparted to other organizations.
Whatever their effectiveness in stemming the cycle of poverty, stimu-
lating self-help economic efforts, or serving as a device for social control,
legal services programs have provided justice to thousands of people in
the last five years. The poor man who wishes a divorce, the widow who
wishes to resist eviction from a house, the family that has purchased a
defective appliance, the welfare recipient who has been denied funds,
all are powerless in a system that requires the lawyer to serve as an inter-
mediary in order to resolve disputes, unless a lawyer is available to them.
The tremendous increase in the total number of cases handled is a
measure of the number of times a poor man has been shown that justice
is not an illusion in our society.
UNANSWERED PROBLEMS
As we move into the seventies, there are a number of problems that
need to be solved. The following are areas which need immediate atten-
tion.
Funding
It is clear that the present level of funding is hopelessly inadequate
to meet the needs of more than a small percentage of the people who require
but cannot afford legal services. Little has been done to determine how
much will be needed. The basic reason is that the amount involved, by
any calculation, greatly exceeds any reasonable expectation of the funds
that will be immediately available. We are reaching the point, however, at
which we must develop reasonably accurate cost estimates for future
services.
Estimates of the cost of a good national program must be purely
speculative, but by the end of the seventies, approximately 400 million
dollars is not an unreasonable figure."83 This sum may seem large, in view
of the amounts we have spent on legal aid in the past. Yet it is small
compared with the amount spent on health services, space exploration,
the defense establishment, and many other federal programs. Obviously,
."'See Greenawalt, Reformers Against the Clock, in Symposium, OEO and
Legal Services, 14 CATer. LAW. 92 (1968). Mr. Greenawalt quotes the American
Bar Foundation as estimating a cost of 300 to 600 million dollars. Id. at 98.
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it will require political muscle to obtain appropriations of this magnitude.
The goal will not be insurmountable if we accept a national commitment
that a free society cannot ration justice.
There are genuine doubts whether money can be spent wisely unless
the national program expands slowly. Planned development would place
new programs only where there are "receptive boards," staffed with the
"right kind" of attorneys. It is prudent to inquire whether these proposals
to slow the growth of legal aid stem from a philosophy of an "approved
school solution" for the way legal aid should be provided. Specifically,
should this solution be the exclusive program for federal aid?
"Receptive boards" may be boards that accept the concept of repre-
sentation of the poor in policy-making and do not interfere with the
concentration of resources on test litigation; the "right kind" of attorneys
may be recent graduates without experience at the bar, who are dedicated
to the idea that the goal of legal aid is to accomplish fundamental institu-
tional change through the litigation of test cases. For adherents of this
approach, there is no need to seek funds for local communities that wish
to choose their staffs from the practicing bar and devote their efforts
primarily to servicing the needs of clients. Similarly, there is no need
to consider the costs of financing "judicare" proposals, because they are
unlikely to achieve the objective of institutional reform.
We will examine the component parts of this approach as we pro-
ceed. For now, it is sufficient to note that the objectives of legal aid and
the manner in which these objectives can be accomplished are important
determinants of how much money is needed. Institutional reform is neces-
sary and-to a limited extent-can be accomplished through test cases
at least in some jurisdictions. But we think that the basic objective of
a national system must be to provide lawyers for people who need legal
assistance in the routine problems that they meet in society. The achieve-
ment of this objective is much more costly than the budget proposals now
considered appropriate by some OEO officials.
Necessarily, most of these funds must come from the federal govern-
ment. Charitable giving for legal aid is not likely to increase significantly.
The states do not have the revenue to meet their current needs for educa-
tion, roads, sewerage, welfare and police services, and cannot be expected
to foot the cost of the kind of program that is needed. The federal govern-
ment, in the Economic Opportunity Act, recognizes its responsibility to
promote the principles of equal justice implicit in the Constitution. This,
however, does not eliminate the necessity for state funding as well. It
is essential to plan an integrated program which will provide legal
services in civil and criminal cases with federal grants-in-aid meeting
most of the costs. State participation should not be fictional, as has some-
times been the case with local share requirements under OEO. State
funds, not services in kind, should be required, but money appropriated
for criminal cases must be regarded as state contributions towards an
integrated program for providing legal services to the poor.
The development of first-rate programs will require a different basis of
funding. The present system of one-year grants provides no permanency
during the first year of a program's operation. It impairs the capacity
of a program to attract first-rate lawyers who do not wish to leave prac-
tice for a program that has no certainty of continuing, and exercises an in-
hibiting effect on local boards of directors and staffs.
Techniques for Providing Services
There is a need to develop greater flexibility concerning the best
ways for providing legal services to the poor. In theory, creativity and
innovation have been encouraged by OEO. In practice, the programs
have largely consisted of staffed neighborhood offices. There is no effec-
tive method of providing legal services to many people throughout the
country except by subsidization of private lawyers who undertake cases
for indigents. Although the Wisconsin experiment (Judicare) has indi-
cated that the costs of administration may be high,184 no alternative has
yet been found for small towns and rural areas. A substantial reduction
in costs is foreseeable, however, if the private attorney is given assis-
tance. For instance, in certain areas of poverty law, assistance could
be given by specialists located in the law schools or in legal aid centers
in the state.185
18
" Preloznik, Wisconsin JTdicare, 25 LEGAL AID BRIEF CASE, 91, 92-93 (1967).
See also Marsh, Neighborhood Law Offices or Tldicare?, 25 LEGAL AID BRIEF
CAsE 12, 14, 16-17 & n.6 (1967).
211 See Mooney, Legal Services and the Legal Establishment, 70 W. VA. L.
Rnv. 363 (1968). In describing a proposed system for West Virginia, Pro-
fessor Mooney concluded:
I envisoned the law schools performing the legal R & D work of freeing
a class from servitude, the central legal staff administering justice to poor
communities and ghetto groups, and local lawyers ministering to people in
crisis utilizing the regional center for their legal research, expert non-legal
assistance and comprehensive legal care. The center would administer the
legal services system for its area and communicate and cobrdinate its activi-
ties, research, and findings to the other regional centers.... It seemed to me
not too far-fetched that the internal operations of the center would be system-
199 LEGAL AID
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The California Rural Legal Assistance Program is presently consider-
ing the idea of organizing a large program along the lines of a law firm,
with the managing attorneys serving as partners and the staff attorneys
as associates. We should welcome experimentation with other ideas for
organization. 8
6
The Future of the Office of Legal Services
It is likely that the Office of Economic Opportunity will be reorganized
with a substantial segment of its programs distributed among the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare, the Department of Labor, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, and other departments.
What will happen to Legal Services when OEO is reorganized? Under
HEW it might be submerged under the existing gigantic programs; under
HUD the importance of rural legal services might be ignored; in the
Department of Justice the program might play second fiddle to the prosecu-
tory arm of the government. Creation of a separate agency might result
in its being overpowered in the infighting for a bigger share of the annual
budget.
To leave it in OEO might jeopardize its growth, particularly if the
stronger components, like Operation Head Start, were transferred to
other departments leaving only the weaker and more controversial pro-
grams. It must have independence wherever it is placed. Few would
deny that its separation from the community action programs of OEO
would be desirable. Although supported by CAP funds, most legal ser-
vices programs are not and have not been integrated parts of community
action programs. Nevertheless, the OEO grants provide that local CAP
programs shall "supervise, evaluate, and provide guidance" to legal
agencies which are technically delegate agencies to the local CAP
grantees.18 7 Their inclusion under the CAP umbrella has done much to
atized and computerized so as to process the large number of cases to be
handled, that outreach and intake would be facilitated by specialized groups
of subprofessionals, circuit riders and communicators of various kinds.
I could also see how systemwide communication and co-ordination could be
achieved by leased wire services, closed circuit television systems radiating
to lawyers' offices from the center, and by a motor pool of helicopters ....
Id. at 382-83.
.s'See Reichert, Progress Report: Tri-County Legal Services Program, 9
N.H.B.J. 259 (1967); Shamberg, The Utilization of Volunteer Attorneys to
Provide Effective Legal Services for the Poor, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 159 (1968).
See also Comment, Beyond the Neighborhood Legal Office-OEO's Special Grants
in Legal Services, 56 GEo. L.J. 742 (1968).
... Paragraph 3 of the standard Contract Form, OEO Instruction 6710-1 (Aug.
1968), includes the sentence "The Grantee [the CAP agency] shall supervise, evalu-
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contribute to administrative inefficiency and bar opposition, and little
to improve legal services available to the poor. There should be direct
funding to local legal services programs.
Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor
There are other problems as well. One results from OEO's insistence
on "poor on the board." The Act requires the "maximum feasible par-
ticipation of residents of the area and members of the groups served." ' 8
Early in the history of the OEO, this crystalized into a requirement
that one-third of the members of boards of directors should be repre-
sentative of the poor (modified by exigencies in some communities).
The issue of "poor on the board" raised an emotional block which sub-
stantially hindered the development of legal services programs in some
communities. There are many members of the bar who doubt the poor
have much to contribute to the determination of the policies of a legal
services program; they argue that the poor should be heard through ad-
visory committees, rather than through membership on the board of
directors. They also resist the idea that ethical decisions brought before
the board should be determined in part by laymen. OEO has insisted
that the poor do have a contribution to make in the kind of policy
decisions made by the board of directors. Some OEO representatives have
suggested that, regardless of what the poor can contribute to the solution
of problems, there is a certain therapeutic value in permitting them
to sit with members of the establishment.
There are examples where the representatives of the poor have con-
tributed materially to the work on boards; there are examples where they
have contributed little. There are also examples where insistence on repre-
sentation by OEO has met resistance in local communities with the result
that the poor received neither representation on the board nor the legal
services that they needed. Most programs, however, will be lawyer-run
regardless of whether there are poor on the board. A much greater flexi-
bility on the part of OEO or its successor is required if legal services
programs are to be accepted in the communities least enamored with them.
Frequently, these are the communities that have the greatest need. The
insistence upon a particular formula for constituting a board of directors
ate, and provide guidance and direction to the Delegate [the legal aid program]
ii the conduct of activities delegated under this contract." In addition, the regional
CAP Offices of OEO have constituted an intermediary between local programs and
the national Office of Legal Services.
=" 42 U.S.C. § 2781 (Supp. 1968); cf. D. MovxirAx, MAXImfumI FEASIBLE
MISUNDERSTANDINGS (1969).
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may sacrifice the legal needs of the poor to an OEO principle of limited
utility.
Counsel in Criminal Cases
A major problem arises in criminal cases. OEO is barred from pro-
viding funds for criminal representation."" 9 The reasoning is apparently
that counsel for indigent defendants in criminal cases is constitutionally
required, and, hence, the costs of providing counsel should be borne by
the states. Thus, an anomaly is created: a man may be provided counsel
by an OEO-financed legal aid program if he is to be evicted from his
home, but he may be unable to obtain counsel if he is tried for a mis-
demeanor. In communities where a state-supported public defender or
assigned counsel system is available, no material harm results if the
services provided by these organizationg are coextensive with the needs
of indigent criminal defendants. Unfortunately, however, some states have
interpreted Gideon to require that counsel be provided only in a felony
trial and still cling to the belief that they may constitutionally avoid the
appointment of counsel in misdemeanor cases and at preliminary hearings
in felony cases. 9 ° In many states, legislation is still necessary to imple-
ment In re Gault. 9'
18942 U.S.C. §§ 2701, 2809 (a) (3) (Supp. IV 1968). See note 33 supra.
1
. The right of indigents to appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases varies
from state to state at present. The Supreme Court has failed to decide the issue,
and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), has not been extended, as yet, to
misdemeanors. In Patterson v. Warden, 372 U.S. 766 (1963), the Court vacated a
Maryland misdemeanor conviction and remanded "in light of our opinion in Gideon
v. Wainwright!' Three years later, in Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907 (1966), the
Court declined to review a decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court holding that
there was no constitutional duty on the states to appoint counsel in misdemeanors,
239 Ark. 1151, 397 S.W.2d 364 (1965). Black and Stewart, JJ., dissented from the
denial of certiorari. 385 U.S. at 907. The states have divided into four groups.
Some states have statutes requiring the appointment of counsel in misdemeanor
cases. CAL. PEN. CODE § 859 (West 1956); N.Y. COUNTY LAw § 722-b (McKinney
1965); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 699 (McKinney 1965); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-
2002, -2003 (1955); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROc. art. 26.04 (1965); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 62-3-1 (1966). Other states have extended the right to appointed counsel
to misdemeanors under the administrative powers of their supreme courts. MacDon-
nel v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 277, 230 N.E.2d 821 (1967); State v. Borst, 278
Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967). A third group has recognized a constitutional
right to appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases. Balkovak v. State, 229 Ind. 294,
98 N.E.2d 250 (1951) ; State v. Blank, 241 Ore. 627, 405 P.2d 373 (1965) ; accord,
McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965). Finally, other states have
refused to find a constitutional right or to impose a state rule requiring counsel.
Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S.W.2d 534 (1967); State v. Bennett, 266
N.C. 755, 147 S.E.2d 237 (1966). But see State v. Morris, - N.C. -, 165 S.E.2d
245 (1969).
191387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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Certainly legal assistance to protect liberty is at least as important
as legal assistance to protect property rights. It is difficult to defend a
system that will provide counsel in a small claims court but deny it in a
misdemeanor trial.
Even in states where there are sound systems for providing legal aid
in civil and criminal cases, there may be a need for integration of the two
programs. Almost all systems of legal aid in criminal cases are predicated
upon the assumption that the need for an attorney ends with an acquittal
or an appeal. Any sound system for providing legal services to the indi-
gent, however, must appreciate that the legal problems of the poor man
in a criminal case do not end with final judgment. The acquitted de-
fendant is still poor and has substantial problems to face when he leaves
the courtroom. The convicted defendant needs a continuing relationship
with counsel while he is in prison in order to effectively seek a reduction
of sentence, to have representation before the parole board, or perhaps
to prepare a collateral attack on his conviction. His family needs legal
assistance in civil matters while he is in prison. Crime, criminals, and
falsely accused defendants do not exist in a vacuum. While many crimes
may be unrelated to economic matters, many have their roots in poverty.
It is equally true that representation of the poor in civil mattters provides
an opportunity for advice and counseling that may prevent the involve-
ment of a client in the criminal process. The merger of civil and criminal
legal aid is required if we are to provide legal services that will really
meet the needs of the indigent in a systematic and efficient manner.
Priority for Test Cases
Legal aid programs in the seventies must face up to the question
whether priority should be given to the litigation of test cases.192 The
OEO emphasis on representation in test cases is predicated upon the
assumption that substantial changes in legal institutions can be accom-
plished and that the limited funds available should be used to handle
cases that affect a broad constituency, as distinguished from the particular
client for whom representation is being provided. The successful use of
02 One of the authors of this article suggested at an earlier date that OEO
attempt to establish priorities, and urged that institutional reform should receive the
highest priority. At the same time, however, he urged that OEO be candid with
the bar and he noted that there was a substantial doubt whether law reform could
be accomplished through test litigation in many fields. See Pye, supra note 16,
at 246-49. The views expressed in this article constitute a substantial change
of attitude brought about by experience during the last three years.
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test cases in civil rights litigation and in criminal procedure are cited as
examples. Proponents of the theory assert that it is nothing more than
the kind of representation routinely provided to trade associations, in
which counsel screens cases looking for the best fact pattern to use as a
vehicle for vindicating the rights of the constituent members of the asso-
ciation. There is, of course, considerable merit in these arguments.
On the other hand, some argue that the principal purpose of legal
aid is to provide a lawyer to a poor man who needs counsel in matters
which the client deems to be most significant. Implicit in this proposi-
tion is the assumption that test cases will arise inevitably without plan-
ning, and that no legal services program can continue to enjoy community
confidence and support if, in order to hoard its resources to handle
a test case, it fails to provide the services people need. This contention
is further bolstered by the fact that placing a priority on test cases seems
to suggest that it is proper for a legal services attorney to "play God,"
and to manipulate the clients who come to him for help in order to achieve
what he perceives to be a greater good.
The split between the two camps is perhaps more theoretical than
real. Obviously a lawyer cannot ethically refuse to assert a "test case"
contention if he thinks the best interests of his client will be served by
arguing the point. Programs with the greatest test case orientation will
still undertake some routine matters to serve clients. It is a question of
emphasis in most legal aid offices. However, there are today legal services
programs with substantial staffs that have never successfully litigated any
major test cases and appeal only a few cases in a year. In contrast, the
California Rural Legal Assistance Program (CRLA) has achieved sub-
stantial results by concentrating its resources on the litigation of test
cases, with significant victories in major cases.1 93 A price has been paid,
however. Indigent farm laborers in the area have been turned away from
CRLA offices when they sought a divorce or other routine legal assistance,
which meant a great deal to them personally, although little to the
poor community of rural California.
The test case approach has certain basic weaknesses. First, as long
as legal services programs depend upon local support for their continua-
tion, it is very unlikely that local communities are going to subsidize
... The reports of CRLA reveal a number of outstanding successes. An ex-
ample is the case in which a 210 million dollar reduction in the state-supported
medical services for 1.5 million poor and aged Californians was restored as a
result of a suit filed on behalf of a welfare recipient. Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal.
2d 733, 433 P.2d 697, 63 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1967).
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programs that not only fail to meet the immediate needs of their poor as
perceived by them, but also are designed to change basic institutions in
the community, which the community thinks are operating well. One
cannot successfully require local policy-making and funding, and also
expect priority to be given to securing the kind of basic changes thought
desirable by OEO, but which the local political system is not yet prepared
to make and which the local poor may not understand. Communities will
refuse to provide the local funding in those parts of the country that are
not receptive to the kind of changes OEO would like to accomplish.
Secondly, it is easy to overestimate the contributions that test cases
can make in civil matters. 9 Necessarily, test cases must be won in
appellate courts since few trial courts will display a disposition to depart
from settled law. In criminal cases, the government has little latitude in
mooting an appeal by compromising a case after conviction. In some
civil areas, such as housing and consumer protection, it is reasonable
to anticipate that the economic interests affected can and will make a
concerted effort to buy off the appellants in at least some of the cases
that survive lower court findings of fact in a way that preserves the
salient point for appeal.
There are inherent limitations in the test case process, even when the
cases are won. Fifteen years after Brown v. Board of Education,95 there
is good reason to believe that integration of schools in the South has been
spurred more by the HEW guidelines enforced by the federal funding
carrot than by judicial decrees. In some areas of the law, there simply
is no assurance that there will be wholesale compliance with the clear
implications of a judicial decision by persons who were not parties to the
litigation.
Third, the test case approach assumes that the cases will result in
victories; but, in fact, the likelihood that radical changes in such areas as
landlord and tenant law or consumer protection are going to be accom-
plished in many states through litigation is remote. The state supreme
courts, with a few notable exceptions, are not normally in the vanguard
of creative innovation in the law of property or contract. In many states,
test cases in these areas would probably be lost. Rather than a nationwide
commitment to test cases, a wiser course would be to concentrate test
cases in the courts that are most responsive to the concept of law as a
... See Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services
for the Poor, 80 HARv. L. REv. 805, 814-16 (1967).
10 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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dynamic process that must change with the times. A court that applies
the law as it finds it is not likely to overturn a century of precedent in
landlord-tenant law. It is one thing for a legal services program in New
York, the District of Columbia, or California to give priority to test cases;
it is another to expect a program in Mississippi or Alabama to do like-
wise. In states where it can fairly be predicted that test cases will not be
successful, there is no reason to press in that direction, except perhaps
in the areas in which federal constitutional rights are involved so that
there is ultimately an opportunity to find redress in the federal court
system.
Despite these weaknesses, it is clear that much can be accomplished
in some areas by the test case approach. The experiences of the past
three years demonstrate remarkable success in the fields of public housing
and welfare. A new bill of rights has been written for tenants in public
housing. Many of the most onerous and unconstitutional practices found
in the welfare system have been struck down. Of even greater importance
are the decisive changes in some agencies produced by the successes in
the courts. As previously noted, HUD recognized "increasing dissatis-
faction" with a "number of suits" and issued regulations granting notice
and hearings for those being evicted long before the decision in Thorpe.190
Similarly, HEW has issued extensive guidelines relating to procedural
due process in hearings (including the right to counsel), 1 7 and has
announced a new system designed to curtail extensive investigation into
the backgrounds of welfare applicants.19s Additional regulations have
been issued to curtail the abuses of the "man in the house" doctrine.
10 D
The results of this litigation have clearly worked to the benefit of millions
of Americans.
In other areas, test cases have had more limited success and have
pointed to the need for a legislative effort to complement the gains that
have been realized through litigation. Although there are clear signs
that a major decision on the issue of court costs is in the offing, and a
reappraisal of present procedures in many jurisdictions likely, no monu-
mental victory has been won. In the consumer area, increased judicial
protection is now available, but these decisions will not change the market-
ing practices of those not directly involved in the individual cases. More-
28 See pp. 548-50 supra.
"" Proposed HEW Reg., 33 Fed. Reg. 17853 (1968).
... HEW Reg., 45 C.F.R. § 205.20 (1968).
... 33 Fed. Reg. 11290 (1968).
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over, if they are to have any effect at all, the consumer must first realize
that he has been wronged and seek the aid of an attorney-an uncommon
event. Thus "test litigation" in this field has not succeeded in assisting a
large number of people. For the most part, cases in the landlord-tenant
area are subject to the same criticism, with the possible exception of cases
voiding leases where, at the time rented, the premises do not conform
to the local housing code. Again, however, relief is available only to
those who seek a court order.
To accomplish more fundamental changes in these areas, a legal
services program must not only litigate; it must be able to develop a
legislative program.
There are provisions in the United States Code that establish a
procedure through which the indigent may bring his case and effectuate
an appeal.2 0 Over half the states have similar legislation.20 ' While it
has been pointed out that these statutes are far from perfect, their presence
on the books indicates legislative receptiveness. As previously noted, the
ABA has available extensive research indicating that the fee system fails
to serve the purpose for which it was designed, i.e., to pay for the admin-
istration of the court system.2 0 2 Model in forma pauperis provisions have
been drawn that meet many common objections, for example, by curtailing
frivolous and vexatious litigation."' There is no reason to believe that
state legislatures are not attuned to present injustices or are insusceptible
to common-sense reasoning. There is strong reason for suggesting that
legal services programs, when armed with available material, their own
independent studies, and the handwriting on the wall of recent decisions,
could deal more effectively with the issue of court costs in the state legis-
latures than in case-by-case adjudications.
An identical analysis applies to consumer protection, where strong civil
and criminal laws are needed for the protection of the buying public.
Present state laws are noted for their ad hoc and piecemeal approach.
Protection cannot be guaranteed by federal agencies such as the FTC and
the laws they administer. As stated by Chairman Dixon:
200 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 753(f), 1915(a) (1964).0
' For the scope of these provisions, see Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs
and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Persons in Civil Cases, 2 VALPARAISO L.
REV. 21, 33-36 (1967).
... See note 50 supra, and accompanying text.
... See Silverstein, supra note 200. For application of the federal code to ter-
minate frivolous litigation, see Maloney v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 396
F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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By stopping such practices before they grow into problems of inter-
state proportions, the need for federal action will be minimized, and the
people most directly affected will have a telling voice in deciding
what constituted unfairness and deception. The more effective the
states can be in nipping illegal schemes in the bud, the more energy
the FTC can devote to dealing quickly and effectively with problems
of regional and national significance.2 0 4
The states must enact legislation to give effective consumer protection.
Inasmuch as the overreaching merchant preys on others besides the poor,
a sound political base exists. A number of model acts have been pro-
proposed, including the Uniform Deceptive Practices Act, the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code, and the Uniform Consumer Protection Act. Who
can better present the feasibility and need for such legislation as dem-
onstrated by actual practices in the local market place than a legal services
program?
Finally, we have noted that a channeling of resources for test litiga-
tion in the areas of private housing has had only limited effect. Indeed,
were all of the test cases won-if covenants in a lease were determined
to be dependent, covenants in leases of slum houses were deemed to be
contracts of adhesion, retaliatory evictions were voided, rent strikes were
permitted, a tort of "slumlordism" were recognized, and a lessor of
premises in violation of a housing code were banned from evicting a
tenant for nonpayment of rent2O--it is doubtful that the condition of the
poor in low-cost housing would improve.
Is it likely that landlords will repair their premises, maintain them
and still not raise the rent? Or is it more likely that landlords when forced
to maintain low-cost housing in harmony with housing codes would divert
the property to another, more profitable use? These questions should be
explored before a total commitment to the test case approach in housing
is espoused. The assumption that giving tenants all the rights that they
would like to have will cure the problem of urban low-cost housing seems
a bit naive. The problem must be dealt with in a manner consistent with
realistic economics if decent low-cost housing is to be available to the
poor. We doubt if increasing the rights of the tenant at the expense
of the landlord will by itself do the job. What is needed are legislative
proposals that will redirect economic resources to maintain rather than
201 W. MAGNUJSON & J. CARPER, supra note 117, at 59.
"'See Sax & Hiestand, Slulnordism As a Tort, 65 MicH. L. Rav. 869 (1967);
Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEo. L.J.
579 (1966).
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destroy the housing that poor families require. Profit-making incentives
run counter-so far as the maintenance of housing is concerned-to the
best interests of the poor. Factors such as municipal property taxes, the
capital gains tax, the basis for valuation in condemnation proceedings,
and the depreciation allowance must be reviewed in the overall context of
slum housing. Legislative changes that will provide an economic incentive
for the landlord to provide the kind of housing that the poor have a right
to expect is a necessity. Such a task is most difficult, but if legal aid is to
provide an effective means of helping large classes of the poor, it must
be undertaken.
Finally, there are inherent limitations upon the kind of institutional
change that can be accomplished through test cases or legislative reform.
The plight of the poor largely results from the absence of political and
economic power and social equality. Their disadvantages within the
legal system mirror their predicament. Changes in the legal system alone
can not accomplish the fundamental reallocation of power that is required
if the poor are to be brought into the mainstream of American life. On
the other hand, if the poor can achieve economic and political power, it
is likely that the legal system will promptly reflect the existence of this
power in the manner in which it protects them.
This is not to say that test cases cannot have a substantial effect on
increasing the power of the poor by reducing the extent of inequalities
in American life. In many areas, however, the impact is more likely to
be psychological, by providing proof that the poor as a group can obtain
justice, can share power, and require only the exercise of rights available
within our system to assert that power. In this sense, the winning of a
test case is a catalyst in the process of group organization. The test case
may also have a substantial impact upon public opinion in transmitting
a sense of injustice to the body politic.
We conclude that the dogmatic insistence that all legal services pro-
grams adopt a test case approach is not desirable. Nevertheless, some
test cases are clearly desirable. Some will arise without planning. Others
should be brought in judiciously selected forums in which there is a
reasonable chance of success. In most programs, priority should be given
to meeting the needs of the poor who have no place to go for legal
services. The advantages and limitations upon the test case approach
should be understood, and efforts at legislative reform should be intensified.
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Ethical Problems
Fortunately, there are some problems that will not be as important
in the seventies as they have been in the sixties. It is expected that
community education programs sponsored by legal aid offices will be
explicitly permitted by the new canons of ethics. 20
One ethical problem, however, may become more significant as more
indigents obtain representation accompanied by a commensurate power in
legal aid lawyers to utilize docket delay as a partisan tactical device. The
bar and the courts have done very little to stop the filing of sham
defenses by insurance companies in personal injury litigation for the
purpose of delaying the ultimate settlement of cases. Virtually nothing
has been done to require truthfulness in pleading in such fields as anti-
trust. The law in most jurisdictions makes it unethical for counsel to
file a pleading containing allegations that he knows to be unjustified.207
This problem may reach crisis proportions in legal aid cases. Assertion
of an issue of fact in an eviction proceeding may entitle a tenant to a jury
trial, jamming the docket in courts that traditionally handle thousands of
eviction proceedings summarily. It is no more justified to file a sham
defense for an indigent than for a corporation or an insurance company.
2 See Pye & Garraty, supra note 17, at 873-80; Note, Ethical Problems Raised
by the Neighborhood Law Office, 41 NoTRE DAME LAW. 961 (1966). ABA SPEcIAL
COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF ETHICAL STANDARDS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY Disciplinary Rule 2-102(2), at 20 (Prelim. Draft 1969) provides:
A lawyer may accept employment that results from participation in ac-
tivities designed to educate laymen to recognize legal problems, to make
intelligent selection of counsel, or to utilize available legal services if such
activities are operated or sponsored by:
(a) A legal aid office or public defender office:
(i) Operated or sponsored by a law school approved by the American
Bar Association.
(ii) Operated or sponsored by a bona fide, non-profit organization.
(iii) Operated or sponsored by a governmental agency.
(iv) Operated, sponsored, or approved by a reputable bar association.
(b) A military legal service office.
(c) A professional association, trade association, labor union, or other bona
fide, non-profit organization which, as an incident to its primary activi-
ties, furnishes, pays for, or recommends lawyers to its members or
beneficiaries.
(d) A lawyer referral service operated, sponsored, or approved by a repu-
table bar association.
(e) A reputable bar association.
See also A.B.A. Inf. Op. 992, 54 A.B.A.J. 79 (1968).
207FED. R. CIv. P. 11. See also American Auto. Ass'n, Inc. v. Rothman, 104
F. Supp. 655 (E.D.N.Y. 1952); 1A W. BARRON & A. HOLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 332 (1960).
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It is likewise no 'less justified to file a defense on the mdrits -when the
attorney has reason to believe that a valid defense exists: The. advdnt of
more counsel for defendants in routine cases, which already clog our
metropolitan courts, will require the bar and bench to engage in more
effective action to avoid the use of sham pleadings for the purpose of
tactical advantage.
Suits Against Public Agencies
Presumably we will no longer be faced with the curious hotion that
although it is permissible for a legal aid lawyer to represent an indigelit
in a suit against another indigent (or against any other private party),
there is something reprehensible in an indigent receiving counsel in litiga-
tion involving a public agency. The defeat of the Murphy Amend-
ment hopefully has killed this peculiar concept of equality before the law.
Complementary Methods of Providing Legal Services
In the seventies, it will be necessary to consider alternative comple-
mentary techniques of providing legal services. Hopefully, the percentage
of our population that is unable to afford a lawyer will decrease. Never-
theless, it is clear today that, like the poor, a good part of the middle
class cannot afford a lawyer. It is unreasonable to expect the middle
class to use their tax dollars to provide legal aid to the poor when they
themselves need similar assistance.20 The bar must consider the use of
more para-legal personnel, the standardization of more transactions, and
the acceptance of the concept of group legal services in order to provide
lawyers to the middle class.209
THE FUTURE-A MODEL PROPOSAL
The preceding sections of this paper have attempted a general evalua-
tion of the existing legal aid system in the United States and the challenges
that it is facing. From time to time we have indicated preferences con-
cerning methods for meeting these challenges. In this section, we propose
a model system for the administration of legal aid with the recognition
that local variations will necessarily be required to deal with the Indian
reservations, rural areas, and other specific problems.
We start with the assumption that the provision of legal services
requires massive federal funding. The increase in funding will have to be
206E. CHEATHAM, A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED (1963).
... See AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, LAW IN A CHANGING AMERICA (1968).
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substantial. We have suggested the figure of 400 million dollars as a
speculative estimate of needs by the end of the decade.
National Level
All federal funding for legal aid should be administered by one
department. Which agency administers the national program is less im-
portant than the necessity of insuring that (1) the program is inde-
pendent, and (2) competition between programs sponsored by different
agencies is avoided. The federally sponsored legal services program must
be independent from community action programs, from the welfare estab-
lishment, and-to the extent possible-from political influence at the
national, regional, and local level.
There must be strong national leadership without destruction of local
control over legal aid projects. The American bar is an institution rooted
in the states, in structure and in attitude. There has been a clear tendency
in recent years by OEO to diminish local control by threats of refusal to
fund or to cut back funding.210 There is a giant task to be performed, and
it can be done only if there is a recognition that a diversity of approaches
must be utilized if our goals are to be achieved.
We think that the combination of national leadership and local control
can best be achieved by block grants to the states to finance integrated
programs of legal services to the poor.211 To qualify for a block grant a
state itself would be required to finance an effective system of representa-
tion in criminal cases at all stages. Federal funds would then be available
to finance legal services in civil cases.
The federal funding agency should have the authority to place reason-
able restrictions upon its grants in order to assure that representation is
available in all kinds of civil cases, that designated funds are used for
purposes such as law reform and community evaluation, that the state
system provides counsel at every level of criminal proceedings, and that
records are maintained and funds accounted for in accordance with accep-
table procedures. The agency should also have the power to refuse to
21 The Economic Opportunity Act provides that "[i]n order to promote local
responsibility and initiative, the Director [of OEO] shall not establish binding
national priorities on funds authorized by this section, but he shall review each
application for financial assistance on its merits." 42 U.S.C. § 2808(e) (1967).
... The concept of block grants to the states for financial assistance in providing
needed services, supplemented by federally controlled funds for research and
demonstration projects, has many counterparts. See Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, June 19, 1968.
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fund judicare proposals where services could be provided more econom-
ically and effectively by a staffed office or a mixed system.
In addition to block grants to the states the agency would have a
reasonable amount of its budget available to provide 100 percent funding
for research, training and demonstration grants in civil and criminal
cases. It would be expected that a substantial part of the test case litiga-
tion and legislative proposals for reform would originate in these special
programs. Law schools would be encouraged by grants to study pervasive
problems of poverty and the legal process. Demonstration programs such
as California Rural Legal Assistance would be relieved of service responsi-
bilities in order to litigate test cases.
State Level
In each state there would be an agency, board, or authority, created
by the state bar or the courts to assume responsibility for developing an
integrated program of legal services for the state. It would evaluate the
needs and performance of local programs and prepare an overall state
budget. It would serve as a spokesman to the state government con-
cerning the needs for representation in criminal matters and report to
the state government on the operation of the state-wide program. It
would administer the federal funds by grants to local communities. In
addition to the board of directors, each state program would have a center
with a director and staff able to provide expertise in specialized areas to
local programs and to serve as an advisory and co6rdinating body for
research and legislative reform proposals from local programs and the
law schools. The state center would be capable of performing functions
such as these: the preparation of memoranda and drafting of pleadings
and briefs on request; the preparation of specialized material such as
manuals and studies to assist attorneys working in areas of law affecting
the poor; and the provision of a legislative reference and research division
capable of reviewing existing statutory provisions and drafting proposed
legislation with respect to those laws that adversely affect the poor. The
center should also provide a central file for all legal memoranda and briefs
from past cases. Finally it should establish computer and uniform report-
ing facilities through which the entire case intake of the state could be
channeled in such form as to relieve legal services offices of reporting
difficulties currently experienced. In addition to providing up-to-date
information, this system would also provide needed empirical data concern-
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ing the poor and thus provide a basis for projecting their future legal
needs.
Local Level
We think that legal aid should be administered at the local level by
a combined staff attorney-judicare system operated under the supervision
of the organized bar.212 Civil and criminal legal aid should be merged
in order to provide an integrated program of legal services for the poor,
The development and supervision of a program for legal services
in local communities should be entrusted to a board of trustees composed
of lawyers chosen by the local judges or through the normal processes
of the state bar. In some communities, it might be desirable to have
the poor represented on local boards. In other areas, it might prove more
desirable to have advisory committees of the poor in order to get a feed-
back on whether the services being provided are the kind that they want,
and whether they are provided in a manner acceptable to the recipients.
The program should have a staff of attorneys and investigators whose
salaries are paid from public funds. No attempt should be made by the
staff to represent all indigent defendants. Representation of a substantial
percentage of both civil and criminal defendants should be provided by
assigned counsel in private practice, who would be compensated by court
order or through a judicare system which makes reference to a fixed fee
schedule. Staff attorneys should be used in a large number of civil cases
where advice and negotiation are required and litigation is unlikely;
in criminal cases when immediate representation is needed, such as at
preliminary hearings and lineups; in lengthy cases in which appointment
of private counsel would constitute an unreasonable imposition; in cases
where representation is likely to be a formality, as in mental competency
hearings in many jurisdictions; and in a large percentage of routine mis-
demeanor cases. In addition, staff attorneys would handle some cases
that are recognized as test vehicles requiring special expertise and more
than usual time in preparation. They would also have the responsibility of
community education concerning the rights and responsibilities of the
212 This structure is patterned after the organization of the Legal Aid Agency
of the District of Columbia, established by statute, D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-2202
(1967), and supplemented by support for private counsel assigned by the court
to represent indigents pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.SC.
§ 3006A (1968). In the District of Columbia counsel is provided only in criminal
cases by this method.
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poor and be responsible for the preparation of proposals for legislative or
administrative reforms.
The board would have the duty of allocating cases between the staff
attorneys and the private attorneys, of' fixing the fees of the private
attorneys and the salary scales of staff attorneys, and of alpointing the
staff lawyers. It would also prepare and present the annual budget to the
funding authority.
In small cities, there might be one downtown office, which would
house the staff and handle the general administration of' the program.
In larger cities, there should be a decentralization of offices, which should
be located throughout the city in impacted poverty areas. The neighbor-
hood offices should have the principal responsibility for initially process-
ing clients, providing counseling, conducting negotiations with land-
lords, creditors, and police at the precinct level, and representing clients
before administrative offices and boards. In addition, there should be a
central office located in proximity to the courthouse, which would provide
representation in civil and criminal matters in court, and a competent staff
with responsibility for community education and law reform. The central
office would also provide logistical assistance to private counsel who
undertake indigent cases, by maintaining files of previously prepared
memoranda, pleadings, and briefs, and would furnish the attorney with
the assistance of staff investigators.
A case beginning in a neighborhood would be transferred either to
the downtown trial staff or to a practicing attorney if litigation proved
necessary; the neighborhood lawyer would associate himself with the
trial counsel. Such a system would provide for the promotion of neighbor-
hood lawyers to the litigation staff or to supervisory positions, and at the
same time provide training for young attorneys and employ experienced
trial lawyers to represent clients in litigation. It would relieve the prac-
ticing bar of the responsibility of interviewing a substantial number
of people who do not have claims suitable for litigation, yet utilize its
expertise where it can best be used-in the courtroom.
This system proceeds upon the assumption that the practicing bar
has a large role to play in legal aid, that its members should be compen-
sated for their efforts, but that they cannot, by themselves, do all that
is necessary to be done. A judicare proposal by itself, except in rural
areas where there may be no other alternative, is an inefficient and ex-
pensive manner of handling cases, and raises substantial problems of how
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to evaluate the performance of the system. It is also unlikely that many
practicing lawyers would be able to handle lengthy cases aimed at insti-
tutional change for the kind of fee that would probably be available.
Volunteer services and charitable contributions would be utilized to
provide needs that cannot be met by the combined state-federal budget.
In the operation of this combined staff attorney-judicare system, an
appropriate role should be found for law students. There is a national
movement to permit law students under proper supervision to handle
minor court cases, either by rule of court or by statute.218 A number of
progressive states have acted to modify their statutes dealing with the
unauthorized practice of law in recognition of both the need for more
clinical training if young lawyers are to fulfill the responsibilities placed
upon them when they join the bar and the substantial number of cases
for which funds are not available to provide experienced counsel in
which students can adequately provide representation. There is no danger
of encroachment on the private practice of law if such programs are
limited in terms of the kinds of cases in which students may appear, and
there is no danger to the indigent if there are intelligently administered
standards of supervision.
CONCLUSION
The program suggested would require substantial changes by local
legal services programs, the bar, state governments, and federal funding
agencies. We think that changes are necessary if the poor are to be
provided with the best possible legal assistance. Legal aid may not
develop along the model we suggest, but its expansion seems inevitable.
In its expansion, there must be consideration of the perspectives of the
bar, the indigents, and the government if legal services are to be made
available throughout the country.
For too long we have been content to allow legal services to play a
backstage role; for too long we have permitted dogmatism and friction
to preclude the kinds of programs that we need. The seventies may prove
to be the decade when the challenges of legal aid are met.
"
1
'In 1966 the Association of American Law Schools approved in principle the
promulgation and adoption by rule of court or by statute of provisions permitting
senior law students to appear in court under adequate supervision of members of
the bar on behalf of indigents or the prosecution in both criminal and civil matters.
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